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File 2182/1913 Pt 7 'Arabia: Policy toward Ibn Saud' [‎163v] (328/420)

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The record is made up of 1 item (206 folios). It was created in 4 Jan 1918-7 Aug 1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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•but on ^ 4 tli January battle was. joined between Ibn Sa’ud and Ibn Rashid,
and Captain Shakespear, unarmed and present only as a spectator, met Ins
death. Ibn Sa nd s version of the disaster was that he vwis shot dead by a
Shammar rifle-bullet, but this statement is in any case based only on second
hand information, as it is undisputed that Captain Suakespeai had taken up
a position in a different part of the field from that where his host was
located. ' Since then various and divergent accounts of what happened have
been recited, one of little more value than another, but the balance of
evidence goes to show that he was first wounded in the leg and disabled,
and soon "afterwards killed in the charge of Ibn Rashid’s cavalry, which,
overwhelmed the flank on which he was posted. In the sauve qui pent
which ensued it is feared that he was either abandoned or # forgotten, but
the precise circumstances of his untimely death will probably never be
ascertained. Ibn Sa’ud expressed profound icgiet foi the loss of ^.OiieS*
whom he regarded as a brother, anil always lefeis to mm \\ ith icspect and
affection.
7 . The action was indecisive : both parties claimed the victory, and both
were tempoiarily crippled and forced to retire.- It was an unexpected and
a somewhat disconcerting result, for Ibn Sa’ud's preparations had been made
on an exceptional scale and his forces were said largely to outnumber those
of Ibn Rashid, though he was inferior in cavalry. The accounts given by
the Arabs attribute his defeat to the treachery of the ’Ajman. ^ Ibn Sa’ud’s
personal courage is beyond question, but he not uncommonly falls short as
a tactician, and Mubarak of Kuwait pronounced him to be a poor leader in
battle. But if he had not dealt Ibn Rashid a crushing blow he had at least
put him out of action and prevented him from joining the Turks, as he
unquestionably would have done. The intervention of Ibn Rashid in the
early part of the Mesopotamian campaign might have added considerably to
our difficulties. Nevertheless, Captain Shakespear’s death was a heavy
price to pay for the advantage of immobilising him.
8 . The two Chiefs held apart without further hostilities till the summer,
when an agreement dated 10 th June was concluded between them. Ibn
Rashid recognised Ibn Sa’ud’s claims, except that of overlordship, which he
' could scarcely be expected to acknowledge, and undertook not to play a
treacherous game towards the Turkish Government, but to incline towards
whichever Government was in alliance with Ibn Sa’ud. He confined his own
jurisdiction to Hail and its villages and the Shammar tribes, while Ibn Sa’ud
was acknowledged to hold all Najd from Al Khahaf to Dawasir. A1 Khahaf
is no doubt the Kahafah of Hunter’s map, a little north of latitude 27°. In
a tribal country the adjustment-of frontiers can never be very exact, but it is
clear that Ibn Rashid renounced all pretensions to the Qasim, a province
whose rich oases had frequently changed hands. It is of interest to note
that the tribes reckoned as subject to Ibn Sa’ud are the Mutair, ’Ataibah,
Harb, Bani ’Abdullah, ’Ajman, Murrah, Manasir, Bani Hajar, Subai’, Sahul,
Qantan and Dawasir ; but this catalogue must not be taken as exact, for the
Mutair are mostly in Kuwait territory, and the ’Ataiban and Harb come for
the greater part under the Sharif.
9. After Captain Shakespear’s death Ibn Sa’ud sent an immediate request
that another officer should be accredited to him, or, failing this, that
negotiations should continue through his agent in Basrah, ’Abdul Latif
Mandil. No suitable officer was available, but Ibn Sa’ud was advised to
sign a preliminary agreement on the lines of Captain Shakespear’s draft and
leave all details to be settled later. He signed and returned the new draft
which had been sent to him, but with some important modifications, con
cerning which it seemed better to postpone further discussion till a meeting
with the Chief Political Officer could be arranged. For the time, therefore,
the conclusion of the treaty was suspended, Ibn Sa’ud being wholly engaged
with internal affairs. His position at home at this epoch was the reverse of
secure. His reputation among the tribes had suffered from the unsuccessful
operations against Ibn Rashid, during which he had incurred much loss in
material and equipments, and during the greater part of 1915 he was
engaged with a dangerous rising in the Hasa on the part of the ’Ajman.

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Part 7 primarily concerns relations between Bin Saud [‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Sa‘ūd] and King Hussein of Hedjaz [Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī, King of Hejaz].

It includes discussion as to whether Britain should provide Bin Saud with military assistance to enable him to take decisive action against Bin Rashid (also referred to as Ibn Rashid) [Saʿūd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Rashīd, Emir of Ha'il]. The policy advocated by the Government of India is that Bin Saud should be 'kept in play' by gifts of money but that arms and military instructors should be supplied sparingly. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Zachariah Cox and Harry St John Bridger Philby, on the other hand, favour an offensive against Hail [Ha'il] by Bin Saud, with British assistance. Also included are the following:

  • a memorandum from the War Cabinet's Middle East Committee, on the position of Bin Rashid in relation to other Arab rulers;
  • a note entitled 'Relations With Ibn Sa'ud', prepared by the Arab Bureau's Irak [Iraq] section, which provides a British perspective on Britain's relations with Bin Saud from 1899 onwards;
  • notes on conversations held between Colonel Cyril Edward Wilson and Major Kinahan Cornwallis of the Arab Bureau, and Emir Abdulla [ʿAbdullāh bin al-Ḥusayn], son of King Hussein, during December 1917;
  • a copy of a report by David George Hogarth on his interviews with King Hussein at Jeddah;
  • a memorandum from the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Kuwait, Colonel Robert Edward Archibald Hamilton, which is primarily concerned with relations between Kuwait and Riyadh;
  • notes by Hamilton on Bin Saud, based on conversations with the latter at Riyadh in November 1917;
  • correspondence between British officials regarding King Hussein's attempt to reoccupy Khurma and its impact on his relations with Bin Saud.

This item features the following principal correspondents:

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File 2182/1913 Pt 7 'Arabia: Policy toward Ibn Saud' [‎163v] (328/420), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/389/1, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100032845622.0x00008a> [accessed 25 April 2024]

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