File 2182/1913 Pt 7 'Arabia: Policy toward Ibn Saud' [‎165r] (331/420)

coopeiation witli ns m tlie coininoii task of oxpellnio - tiie Turks from Arabia
As to I bn k>a ml s o\\ 11 position, lie need Lave no misgivings, for lie had been
acknowledged by us to be-an independent ruler, and the Sharif must
recognise the full import of the treaty. The British Govermuent had no
reason to believe that he entertained any hostile intentions against the tribes
and territories of Najd.
15. In the negotiation over the treaty in December 1915, Sir Percy Cox had
discussed with fbn Sa’ud the possibility of his giving us assistance against
Ibn Rashid. The Hakim of Najd then thought that Ibn Rashid would
either come in or maintain a strict neutrality; if, however, he showed himself
actively hostile, Ibn Sa’ud would attack him and incite the northern ’Anazah
against him. This intention, however, he failed to carry out. During the
spring and summer of 191(5 he was occupied with a rebellion of the Murrah,
following on, and perhaps connected with, that of the ’Ajman, which
endangered his communications with the Hasa. Though a large proportion
of the lighting men of the Shammar had gone north with Ibn Rashid against
the ’Iraq, no effective attack was made on Hail in their absence. In late
June or early July, Ibn Sa’ud’s son, Turki, raided Jabal Shammar, and the
news may have hastened Ibn Rashid’s retreat from our frontiers. In
September or October Turki renewed hostilities against some of the
Shammar Shaikhs and an allied section of the Harb, but the affair resulted
only in the capture of a small amount of booty, and Ibn Sa’ud’s doctor,
passing through Bahrein, brought a message to the effect that the Amir
could do nothing against the Shammar as long as the fugitive ’Ajman
remained on his Hank. The true reason for his inactivity was no doubt his
own insecurity at home, but the* implacable hostility which he entertained
toward the ’Ajman, whom he regarded not only as rebels, but as the murderers
of his brother Sa’ud, threatened to become a problem of some difficulty.
10. When Shaikh Mubarak died in December 1915, Ibn Sa’ud pressed his
son and successor in Kuwait, Jabir, to drive out the ’Ajman Shaikhs. Jabir
made a temperate reply. He was unwilling to eject the ’Ajman, fearing
that they would be thrown into the enemy camp ; but he could not hold out
against Ibn Sa’ud’s insistence without creating an open breach, and he
expelled the tribe in February 1910. As he anticipated, they turned for
protection first to ’Ajaimi and then to Ibn Rashid, but in May they asked
and obtained permission from the Shaikh of Zubair -to settle quietly near
Safwan, and subsequently several of the leading Shaikhs made submission
to us. When Ibn Rashid returned to Hail only two of the ’Ajman Shaikhs
remained with ’Ajaimi and they had little or no following. Ibn Sa’ud’s
ardent desire to direct his energies upon the extermination of this tribe
was not one with which we had any sympathy, at all events at the present
j uncture.
17. Shaikh Jabir, new to his office, could not hope to exercise the influence
over Ibn Sa’ud which had been possessed by that practised and ^ weighty
diplomatist, his father ; moreover, for some years before Mubarak’s death,
relations between Riyadh and Kuwait had been growing cooler. Ibn Sa’ud
bitterly resented Mubarak’s attitude during the negotiations between himself
and the Ottoman Government in the spring of 1914. According to his
account, the Shaikh had at first counselled him to accept the Turkish offers ;
but when he reached Kuwait in April, Mubarak changed his note without
exnianation and advised Ibn Sa ud not to come to teims with ihe links,
refusing at the same time to be present at his meeting with the delegates.
So indignant was the Amir that he expressly stipulated with Captain
Shakespear that Mubarak should not be consulted in the negotiations with
ourselves. The asylum given to the’Ajman was another grievance, and in
1916 Ibn Sa’ud complained of the incidence of the transit dues which had
been, from time immemorial, levied in Kuwait.
IS While Ibu Sa’ud’s anxiety as to the ambitions^of the Sharif and his
grow in estrangement with Kuwait showed that the chiefs allied with
ourselves had not reached a satisfactory understanding with each other,