File 2182/1913 Pt 7 'Arabia: Policy toward Ibn Saud' [‎193r] (387/420)

From Sir l\ Cox, l‘j>th January 1918. j ^
(Addressed to Foreign, repeated to Secretary of State for India.)
389. Following from Philby, M. 25, 1 lih January :—
“Have had two interviews since last report. First, I produced actual
letters t akhri with a view to convincing King, but latter resolutely refused
to allow them to be read, repeating conviction of Sand’s treachery. In all
matters relating Sand, King utterly impossible and unreasonable, though
unable substantiate single accusation or grievance. Basic principle of
King’s policy seems to me determination to prevent any Arab potentate
sharing in bounty of Britain, lest his difficulties in establishing unjustifiable
claims of Kingship of all Arab countries be thereb}- increased. Unable,
however, openly profess such policy lie talks vaguely of conscientious
necessity for concentrating attention on disposal of Turks, by which he
means devotion, all material resources to operations Sherifian forces, no
other object being worth serious consideration. Measure of assistance
given to Saud will be our practical answer to Sherif’s attitude, which 1
venture strongly to deprecate in monarch of his standing as being attitude
best calculated to create and perpetuate discord in Arabia, which it is our
earnest desire to allay. reyc^As
“ Secondly, position being obviously hopeless {V begs me) inducement
better relations between King and Saud we decided to drop matter and
I asked permission depart. Sherif created no altogether unexpected
sensation by declaring firm determination not to allow me to return by land
owing to bad political effect created already by arrival and likely to be
enhanced by return. Personally, think this is mere subterfuge on a parallel
with talk about fatigues and dangers of the journey in respect to Storrs, but
Hogarth and Basset do not concur and have reported to Ik^ ^w^W'Jor orders
as to the attitude to adopt recommending acceptance of situation. My
arguments as to bad effects of refusal or our relations and his with Sand
did not appeal to Sherif, who is in no mood comply with reasonable
demands of Government in this conjunction. Venture strongly protest
against King’s attitude to British emissary, now his guest, in view of fact
that I came to Taif only to meet Egyptian representatives and would not
have come down here except at his personal invitation. Trust you will
support my protest and endeavour procure reconsideration ol attitude.
“ Thirdly, my failure to return by land, joined with failure of mission
to procure help for him, will not improve matters with Saud, and would
suggest that if Sherif insists on return by sea I should do so on pretext,
vis’-d-vis Saud, of visiting Egyptian Government, or L? 1 to collect arma
ment and funds promised him. This would solve situation, but involves
reversion to Hail offensive, proposals which I trust vill not lie lightly
dropped, especially in view of King s general attitude. Could not pioposals
be sanctioned, and requirements be supplied, without any intimation to
King, who could not well protest if Hail was captured supposing no alteration
uj Hedjaz situation, while if Turks and Rashid broke up befoie Saud iendy
1 could stop him taking further action ?
“ Finally, please disassociate me from any personal feeling prospective
total failure mission, but I carefully say if it results in nothing it is very
great pity it was ever sent, as it/will merely liave resulted in pio\ing Saud
perfectly loyal and making muUcu&d suspicions of our motives and coolness
towards us with possibly disastrous results.
“Hogarth has copy.”