File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎258v] (100/602)

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I earnestly represent, firstly, that matter is far more complicated than is
supposed and has two sides ; secondly, that Ibn Sand cannot abandon Khurma
to its fate without risking widespread disturbance of Naim tribes whose first
act in any case would be to attack Sheriff with help of the Southern tribes;
and, thirdly, that in any case Khurma will never submit to Sheriffian attacks
while every unsuccessful attempt of Sheriff makes the feeling of Central Arabia
increasingly unfavourable to us.
According to my information considerable number of > aim troops formerly
serving in Sheriffs forces have come away owing to Sheriff’s atutude and
hostility to Naim and (two groups undecipherable) Ataiba Sheikhs a»
significant.
Fourtblv, have never ceased to make (it) clear to Ibn Saud that owing to
active participation in war and general political considerations His Majesty s
Government will not suffer any prejudice in Sheriff s interests. At same time
have made terms clear His Majesty’s Government will without fail protect Ibn
Saud(’s) legitimate interest(s). He asks for no more than that and as already
frequently reported is ready to submit all disputable matters to British Gov
ernment on above basis. At same time he is determined to surrender none of
his legitimate claims to aggression by Sheriff. Venture to submit that no
exception can be taken to above attitude and that this proved m various ways
culminating in his letter to Sheriff, sincerity(?) of his desire lor peaceful
solution. Extract ends.
78
Telegram R., No. 7419, dated the 7th (received 8th) September 1918.
From— The Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , Baghdad,
'Pq Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla,
(Addressed to His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India; repeated to the
British High Commissioner, Egypt.)
Philbv writes, August Begins. Regarding suggestion* to divert
Ibn Sand’s attention have had that
* senai No 43 . purpose in mind for long time and have
come to following conclusions :—
(1) That Khurma affair has gone too far and created too much feeling
among people of Naim to put forward any satisfactory solution other than
imposition of mutual hands off policy on both sides for period of war. Am
perfectly convinced that even if I bn Saud can be persuaded to hold aloof,
renewal of attacks on Khurma will result in widespread conflagration which
once started will be impossible to control. Turks in Asir and Madina and Ibn
Rashid can scarcely fail to profit by such situation.
(2) Assuming above settlement of Khurma trouble, it is always possible
that some petty event or other of Badawin life will raise Ataiba problem or
that of boundary generally and am convinced that it is desirable to divert
Ibu Sand’s attention from such matters. Nevertheless am convinced that
mere gift of money or profit (able) land would not serve the purpose as such
gift would still leave him idle. In any case doubt if he would accept gift of
land in Mesopotamia and primd fade (?) doubt wisdom of introducing
Wahabi elements into country.
(3) In my opinion real activity is only panacea for ills arriving
from natural indolence of life of the Arabs and this conclusion I have kept
steadily in view in connection with the proposed operations against Hail.
With limited resources at my disposal I have not been able to do very much
hut have felt naturally reluctant to abandon Hail offensive.
Nevertheless, had it not been for such dispositions as I have been able to
make no changes would ha^ e been ready to direct, diversion o
consequent upon first attack on Khurma,
O