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File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎270r] (124/602)

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The record is made up of 1 item (300 folios). It was created in 7 Aug 1918-26 Dec 1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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124
Secondly, certain obvious criticisms of new scheme hare doubtless been
considered but remedy not stated, namely:
(1) If Najdis may purchase without pass, permission or question how
is Abdulla Nafisi to ascertain what they purchase for exporter how prevent
undesirable Najdi individuals purchasing to smuggle to enemy. Without
blockade staff he cannot be expected to do either.
(2) If passes abolished how can Ibn Saud check arrivals this end.
Personally can see no remedy short of entertainment of private blockade
staff by Abdulla Nafisi or subjection of Najd exporters to inquisition by
Shaikh’s blockade officials. Pormer alternative obviously impracticable and
would be more offensive to Shaikh than British blockade. Latter would
produce endless friction between Shaikh and Ibn Saud in view of present
strained relations due to breakdown of Ajman arrangements.
Thirdly, absolutely no guarantee of Shaikh’s good faith and no means
of satisfying ourselves bow he acquits himself of his duties. Previous record
makes it extremely unlikely he will keep out Shammar and Ajman smugglers.
Indeed when last post left Koweit, following caravans from Hail were actually
in Koweit, namely, (1) Saad A1 Hizzani and Azaima with 70 camels and (2)
Abdul Aziz Ibn Humaiyim and Abu Adal with unknown number. We thus
revert to original unsatisfactory situation of two years back which gave rise
to all this trouble.
Fourthly, deplore invidious task criticising accomplished fact but Ibn Saud
extremely sore about new development. Prom the beginning he has always
taken line that he cannot blockade his territory without losing hold over
Qasim elements unless serious effort made to blockade Koweit itself. After
much discussion and the fiasco of last April, scheme of blockade was evolved
which was not only effective as evidenced by large crop of Shainmar advances
but gave universal satisfaction in Najd. Ibn Saud threw himself with zest
into task of ensuring effective measures here and had evolved simple and
stringent scheme which promised complete success when suddenly without
consultation all arrangements cancelled. In circumstances Ibn Saud asks me
inform Government that he cannot accept any resposibility for leakage of
goods to enemy so long as Koweit remains open to all comers. He also points
out that such leakage will prejudice his plans for action against Shammar and
Ibn Bashid.
Fifthly, am not in position appreciate relative merits efficient blockade
and maintenance friendly relations with Shaikh at expense thereof but possible
effect of new measures on Najd blockade has not been considered. On tljis
point I have no illusions. Undesirable Najdis will be the first to reopen trade
with enemy. Difficult suggest remedy but offer following suggestion for
consideration, namely;—
(1) Leave Koweit arrangement unaltered so far as concerns reasonable
requirements of town and tribes.
(2) Forbid access to Koweit markets by all Najdis traders or Badawin.
(3) Notify India that in future Bahrain, Qatif or Uqair will be Najd
trade inlets and request them to notify public accordingly and allow ships to
discharge Najd cargoes there either on outward or return journey without limit
of quantities.
(4) Ibn Saud will see that cargoes are not re-exported by dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. from
Qatif and Uqair while at Bahrain. Dhows should obtain clearance certificate
showing destination and cargo. Those coming to Hasa ports will be examined
by Ibn Saud’s Collector of Customs. Have discussed possible solution on
these lines with Ibn Saud who approves proposa] and is ready to notify Najdis
and Abdulla Nafisi that no Najdi is to go to Koweit for any purpose without
his permission and to accept full responsibility as before for effective blockade
of all stuff landed at ports mentioned. Bahrain merchants if notified would
soon indicate their requirements to Indian agents and it would be essential to
ensure sailing of reasonable number of ships say on basis of previous sailings
to Koweit.

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Part 8 primarily concerns relations between Bin Saud [‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Sa‘ūd] and King Hussein of Hedjaz [Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī, King of Hejaz]. Included are the following:

  • discussion as to which ruler has the stronger claim to Khurma, and whether Bin Saud should be encouraged to begin hostilities against Bin Rashid [Saʿūd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Rashīd, Emir of Ha'il], as a way of diverting the former's attention from other matters;
  • copies of a treaty between the British government and Bin Saud, which was signed on 26 December 1915 and ratified on 18 July 1916;
  • debate about whether the British should supply Bin Saud with more arms and ammunition (to make amends for providing him with 1000 cheap Winchester rifles);
  • discussion of the possible benefits of arranging a meeting either between King Hussein and Bin Saud or between the former's son and the latter's brother;
  • discussion about the possibility of an officer from the Egyptian service succeeding Harry St John Bridger Philby as the British representative to Bin Saud;
  • reports of Bin Saud having begun operations against Bin Rashid, and discussion as to how the British should respond;
  • speculation on King Hussein's actions in Khurma and the implications for Britain's policy in the region;
  • a copy of a memorandum from the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department, entitled 'Memorandum on British Commitments to Bin Saud';
  • reports of an Ikhwan force advancing towards Mecca, and discussion as to how the British should respond.

This item features the following principal correspondents:

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1 item (300 folios)
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English in Latin script
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File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎270r] (124/602), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/389/2, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100032845623.0x00009a> [accessed 19 April 2024]

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