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File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎275r] (134/602)

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The record is made up of 1 item (300 folios). It was created in 7 Aug 1918-26 Dec 1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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before), we referred the matter to you and you expressed the opinion that we
should not be friend tribes of Ibn Rashid on account of his enmity to His
Britannic Majesty’s Government and the help he renders to the Turks unil we
could guarantee that they would not return to him or afford him assistance.
We explained to you that we could not do that as Shammar and Ibn Rashid
were all the same for good and evil. Our object in bringing in the Shammar
was based upon political expediency, both internal and foreign, that is to say,
it seemed that our doing favours to them and supplying them with their needs
would, after all, run result in friendship between them and us and enmity
between them and Ibn Rashid; and we should be able to have access to
their Councils and prompt them neither to help Ibn Rashid against us nor to
further his pro-Turk policy or interests; a course which would result in
reducing Ibn Rashid to the same weak state in which he was at Hajar and
other places.
We also pointed out that if we displayed ^n aggressive attijpde to the
Shammar or banish them from our territories we should harm ourself, as, in
the first place, we were afraid they would seek shelter with you (as has already
happened) and get their needs (supplies, &c.) from you, and then in the
spring would turn round and ally themselves with Bin Rashid in revenge for
our having banished them from our country, and in furtherence of Ibn
Rashid’s cause. In the second place, Ibn Rashid would have strong reasons
vis-a-vis the Turkish Government for declining siding with the Shammar in
his weakness, on the excuse that we (Ibn Saud) have fought his tribe and
helped the British against the Turks. In these circumstances the Turks
would be obliged to help Ibn Rashid with arms, supplies, money and &c. (as
they have already done and are still doing). We told you then that this would
be the inevitable result.
Ibn Rashid has now achieved his objects. The Shammar have sought
shelter with you in order to derive from you their needs, and will thus have no
grievance against Ibn Rashid regarding their starvation and so forth. Conse
quently enmity has ensued between us and the Shammar, who, bearing
grudges against us for having banished them from our territories, are now
obliged to help Ibn Rashid and seek shelter with him, though some of them
have no liking for him. Ibn Rashid has, likewise, gained another object from
the Turks : While claiming (locally) that he has won the Shammar over to
his side after dispersion by Ibn Saud and at a time when he (Ibn Rashid) had
already got sufficient forces of his own ; he tells the Turks that he is unable
to help them because his tribes and country are being threatened. He has
thus, as you will see, obtained his needs from the Turks, who as you must have
beared did not fail to meet his wants.
We are now, therefore, at a loss what to do. We are no more as we were
before, at a time when we used to deal ourselves with our affairs and seek for
our interests whenever they were, and ar, a time when we were not bound,
with your Government settling our affairs in a manner advantageous both to
us and to them. We no longer deal with our affairs in accordance with our
own knowledge of the Arabs and the policy that would best suit them. On
the contrary the British Government has now become as it were two Govern
ments—that of Egypt (which goes by the words of the Sheriff, believes him,
ahff executes bis ambitions, whether right or wrong), and that of Iraq, which
receives our enemies with open hands and prevent us from punishing them.
Take for instance the Ajman and tho Shammar, although they go against us
and against the Government, to the advantage of Ibn Rashid and tbe Turks,
yet they are offered facilities for coming in to you in order to take away their
supplies, &c., whenever necessary. %
These have demonstrated their enmity to us by raiding our adherents
and plundering their properties. Our subjects, who are under us, consist of
the following:—Those who are friendly with us and give advice to us
and who shut their eyes in disgust at these deeds and feel disappointed and
sorry for their occurrence—and those who are ignorant, and contemplate
reverting towards the said hostile tribes due (and thanks to God for it) to our
pressure on them, in that we, for the sake of keeping the subjects in perfect
orde’* irnd rest, do not allow anyone to trespass on the other.

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Part 8 primarily concerns relations between Bin Saud [‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Sa‘ūd] and King Hussein of Hedjaz [Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī, King of Hejaz]. Included are the following:

  • discussion as to which ruler has the stronger claim to Khurma, and whether Bin Saud should be encouraged to begin hostilities against Bin Rashid [Saʿūd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Rashīd, Emir of Ha'il], as a way of diverting the former's attention from other matters;
  • copies of a treaty between the British government and Bin Saud, which was signed on 26 December 1915 and ratified on 18 July 1916;
  • debate about whether the British should supply Bin Saud with more arms and ammunition (to make amends for providing him with 1000 cheap Winchester rifles);
  • discussion of the possible benefits of arranging a meeting either between King Hussein and Bin Saud or between the former's son and the latter's brother;
  • discussion about the possibility of an officer from the Egyptian service succeeding Harry St John Bridger Philby as the British representative to Bin Saud;
  • reports of Bin Saud having begun operations against Bin Rashid, and discussion as to how the British should respond;
  • speculation on King Hussein's actions in Khurma and the implications for Britain's policy in the region;
  • a copy of a memorandum from the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department, entitled 'Memorandum on British Commitments to Bin Saud';
  • reports of an Ikhwan force advancing towards Mecca, and discussion as to how the British should respond.

This item features the following principal correspondents:

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1 item (300 folios)
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English in Latin script
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File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎275r] (134/602), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/389/2, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100032845623.0x0000a4> [accessed 24 April 2024]

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