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File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎341v] (267/602)

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The record is made up of 1 item (300 folios). It was created in 7 Aug 1918-26 Dec 1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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87
rf w0 porbid access to Koweit markets by all Najdis traders or Badawin.
m, ree —Notify India that in future Bahrain, Qa,tif or Uqair will be Najd
trade inlets and request them to notify public accordingly and allow ships to
discharge Najd cargoes there either on outward or return journey without
limit of quantities. , . , ,, -
Four .—Ibn Sand will see that cargoes are not re-exported by dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. from
Ofttif and Uaair while at Bahrain. Dhows should obtain clearance certificate
stow ng destSion and cargo. Those coming to Hasa porte will be examined
by Ibn Saud’s Collector of Customs. Have discussed possible solut.ou on these
lines with Ibn Sand who approves proposal and is ready to notify Najdis and
Abdulla Nafis that no Najdiis to go to Koweit for any putpose without a
permission and to accept full responsibility as before tor effective blockade
of all stuff landed at ports mentioned. Bahrain merchants if notified would
soon indicate their requirements to Indian agents and it would be essential to
ensure sailing of reasonable number of ships say on basis of previous sailings
to Koweit.
Result would he automatically stop inland export trade from Koweit
as all buyers would he clearly buying for enemy.
As only alternative is acquiescence in all round breakdown of blockade
and leakage to enemy trust proposals will receive urgent favourable consider-
ation to relieve tension here.
Finally Koweit advices to Ibn Saud indicate heavy bear sales of British
futures owing to our climbdown which is attributed to serious war situation
evidenced by defeat in France and cessation of news from Palestine. Please
keep me informed of all Arab and Palestine activities. Ibnds,
Enclosure No. 4 to Serial No. 66.
Telegram, Fo. 1153, dated the 2nd (received 3rd) August 1918 (Confidential).
Prom—The Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Koweit,
To—The Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , Baghdad.
Following from Philby, Biyadh, M.-ll 1, July 19th In view
recent events, venture submit review of situation during last three months for
consideration.
firstly. On rejoining Ibn Saud last April with Government decision for
communication found him greatly disappointed with outcome of negotiations
undertaken on Our initiative and firmly convinced result due to machinations
of Sheriff. My instructions were to press him maintain effective control Qasim
and stop smuggling and exercise real pressure on Shammar. I was also
authorised to hold out certain attractive inducements in event capture Hail
and assure him of final favourable settlement Ajman question. I also assured
him that our engagements with Sheriff involved nothing prejudicable to his
interests and absolute independence in accordance former agreement. He was
pleased with last two items but said his blockade must depend largely on
effective measures by us at Koweit. I reassured him on this point. Finally he
declared that owing cost of keeping his army in field and absence of ready
money he could not undertake operations against Shammar. This I regarded
as sine qua non conditions of continuance mission’s work and was thus faced
with alternative of abandoning work or devising other measures. In former
case my conviction^ since fully justified by events was that trouble would
occur with Sheriff if Ibn Saud left to himself in discontented frame of mind.
Therefore chose latter alternative and taking advantage of his financial
situation offered him loan of dollars lying idle at Uqair on condition of action
against Shammar. He accepted offer and offensive was arranged open
beginning Bamdhan. Meanwhile preparations went ahead with every reason
hope success if nothing untoward occurred
Secondly. Becord of events since then as follows :—
One. —Koweit blockade incident of April causing widespread excitement
and resentment throughout Najd but fortunately rectified without delay by

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Part 8 primarily concerns relations between Bin Saud [‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Sa‘ūd] and King Hussein of Hedjaz [Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī, King of Hejaz]. Included are the following:

  • discussion as to which ruler has the stronger claim to Khurma, and whether Bin Saud should be encouraged to begin hostilities against Bin Rashid [Saʿūd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Rashīd, Emir of Ha'il], as a way of diverting the former's attention from other matters;
  • copies of a treaty between the British government and Bin Saud, which was signed on 26 December 1915 and ratified on 18 July 1916;
  • debate about whether the British should supply Bin Saud with more arms and ammunition (to make amends for providing him with 1000 cheap Winchester rifles);
  • discussion of the possible benefits of arranging a meeting either between King Hussein and Bin Saud or between the former's son and the latter's brother;
  • discussion about the possibility of an officer from the Egyptian service succeeding Harry St John Bridger Philby as the British representative to Bin Saud;
  • reports of Bin Saud having begun operations against Bin Rashid, and discussion as to how the British should respond;
  • speculation on King Hussein's actions in Khurma and the implications for Britain's policy in the region;
  • a copy of a memorandum from the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department, entitled 'Memorandum on British Commitments to Bin Saud';
  • reports of an Ikhwan force advancing towards Mecca, and discussion as to how the British should respond.

This item features the following principal correspondents:

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English in Latin script
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File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎341v] (267/602), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/389/2, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100032845624.0x000061> [accessed 23 April 2024]

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