File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎366r] (317/602)

X TELEGRAM RROi; POLITICAL, BAGDAD.
DATED 16th OCTOBER, 1918.
(RECD. 17th OCTOBER, 1918, 2 p.m.)
0ctohMI 69) * I: '° ll0V/ir;e Philb y Qaraa
September 61 " 01106 t0 Secrebar y of telegrarii 14th ^
(1) In issuing these orders presumably His Majesty's
Government have considered end deliberately accepted
risk oi rupture of relations by Bin Saud. In these
circurustances it is not for me to criticise orders
of superior authority but it is my duty to report
that these orders followed by stoppage of arms have
produced profound sensation and Bin Baud makes no
secret of his resentment at treatment (?reeeived)
and of his,unwillingness to accept situation.
(2) These orders crossed my telegram reporting (1)
actual opening of campaign against Bin Rashid, (2)
third Sharifian attack on Khurma resulting according
to official report since received in defeat and flight
of Shakir’s force with loss of two goms and two gmifchine
guns, (3) Refusal of Sharif to accept delivery oi Bin
Saud’s letter, (4) Fakhri’s offer to assist Bin Saud
with arms etc., in campaign, against Sharif.
Finally, it must be realised that change of policy
following so closely on transfer of Sir P. Cox gives
f round for suspicion in Bin Saud’s mind that Government
as changed its policy towards him.
(3) In view of above I should have exercised my
discretion to withhold communication of orders to Bin^
Saud pending further reference to you but fact that his
Koweit agent had reported stoppage of rifles forced my
hand and left me no" alternative but to explain Govern
ments orders.
(4) Bin Saud who has all along regarded Government’s
refusal to support him originally with arms etc., for
Hail campaign as due to Sharif’s machinations regards
latest orders as second triumph for Sharif. He declares
it is not possible for him. now to withdraw from Hail
campaign unless Government guarantee him immunity from
attach by Bin Rashid. ArCdjfinally he points out that
present orders fully justify criticism of his own subjects
that the British alliance is contrary to true interests
of Wahabi cause. His comments and criticisms are full „
of bitterness. "Who” he says, **wiil trust you after this?
(5) On above basis he formulates following ultimatum,
viz*- (1) that the present active alliance against
enemy should be reaffirmed and vigorously prosecuted by
us by provision of arms etc., or, > , .
(2) if British Government desire him to remain
inactive he is perfectly willing to fall in with their
wishes provided that they guar ant edhim absolutely from
all aggression by Ajman, Snanmar friendlies o.i ran
Rashia and Sharif.
This would involve cessation of attacks on Khurma.
pending a decision of the boundary question. And he
somewhat