File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎379r] (343/602)

From Political, Baghdad, llth October 1918. Af '
(Repeated to Foreign and Cairo.) * i ;U-
(Received 14th, 10 a.m.)
8620. Philby writes 26th September. “Had long interview with
I bn Sand this morning. Your telegram authorising me to draw on Koweit
up to 10,000h per mensem and sanctioning issue by Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. of Stores
asked for by me arrived most opportunely last night.
“ Other favourable factors were Ibn Saud’s high elation of his own
recent successes and the fourth victory of Akhwan of Khurma. The fact
that Ibn Sand has actually begun his campaign and cannot withdraw from it
even if he wants to is of utmost importance, while the proved ability of
Khurma to resist attack(s) of Sharif has temporarily obviated necessity of
active intervention from Ibn Saud’s point of view.
“ Summary of interview as follows : —
“ (1) As regards Khurma, Ibn Sand points out with justice that hitherto
he has guaranteed inactivity of people of Khurma as far as offensive by them
concerned on condition that Sharif refrains from further attacks. Sharif has
now deliberately transgressed that condition. He accordingly formallv
withdraws his guarantee and declines any further responsibility for activity
of Khurma people and their Allies. At the same time he has given me his
pledge that, provided we help him in his present campaign and Sharif
refrains from hostile actions against him excluding Khurma, he will in no
wa\ intervene in Khurma affair or assist them in any offensive they may
undertake. At the same time he will not prevent Najd people going to their
help. It should be remembeied in giving this pledge he is largelv influenced
by confidence that Khurma is capable of looking after itself while ive can
lessen numbers of Najdis available to join Khurma by enabling Bin Saud to
concentrate large forces for the Hail operations. Continuance of Sherifan
attacks will result in progressive embitterment of relations with Najd (? which
cannot) but end in violent hostilities. Dor the time being, however, and
while Hail operations continue, venture to add my own guarantee that Bin
Saud will not attack Sharif without full warning to Government of his
intentions. I still press for temporary fixing of boundary line as suggested
and discontinuance of futile attacks prejudicial alike to dignity of Sharif and
prospect of Arabian peace now T and hereafter.
“ (2) As regards Hail operations Bin Saud has now sent out orders for
full muster of whole military force of Central Najd, which should exceed
20,U00 men, which is'probably in excess of available modern rifles. To keep
these continuously in the field he asked for guarantee of regular funds, and
after some discussion I agreed to paying him 10,000k per month so long as
he continued his activities to my satisfaction. The money to be paid at
Koweit in dollars at current rate of 7 per £, i.e., $70,000 on the first Muharram
and each succeeding Musalman month to Abdulla Hellfisi unless instructions
to the contrary received from me. Should be obliged if you wmuld kindly
confirm this arrangement by issue of orders to Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. who will
kindly note this matter carefully. I have further agreed in anticipation of
your sanction to supply of provisions for two months at a time on scale
already sanctioned for one issue. Next issue to be on first day of Rabi
Khawwal, i.e., 3,000 bags rice, 200 sugar, and 200 coffee. Kindly sanction
to enable Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. to reserve necessary quantities from stocks held bv
him. ~
“ (3) As regards arms Bin Saud begging for one quick-firing, one siege
modern gun with personnel, also for more rifles. In both cases I have
informed him I cannot hold out any hope in this direction. Nevertheless,
venture to press for acceptance of my former proposal re rifles or any
smaller number, say, 3,000 or 2,000, considered sufficient. As regards guns
much depends whether actual opening of campaign creates desire in
Governme nt to press matter vigorously. If it does a couple of guns, or
better still a couple of bombing planes would make all the difference in the
world. Venture to recommend latter as experiment. Otherwise leave
matter to your sympathetic consideration (? in view of Fakhris) generous
offer.^ If guns sent they should be sent at once with officer and personnel.
Bin Saud will transport.
“ (4) Bin Saud has conceded permission for me to accompany him in all
future operations. His previous refusal probably due not so much to Akhwan
objections as to nervousness how they would shape in the field. He is now
full of confidence.”
My comments follow.