File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎407r] (399/602)

Relations with Bin Sand.
(Note by Political Department, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .)
1. T-iio recent heavy crop of telegrams on this subject have somewhat obscured
the main issues, and it may make for convenience if a statement is placed before the
Eastern Committee at this stage dealing comprehensively with the whole question.
2. It is the case, as pointed out in Baghdad telegram of the 15th September, that
the recent orders of His Majesty’s Government involve some departure from the policy
adopted in March last. In his telegram of the 9th March 1918 Sir P. Cox
submitted the following recommendations, which were approved by His Maiestv’s
Government:—
<£ We recognise he [he., Bin Sand] may not find it possible to undertake operations
on such a large scale as to enable him to capture Hail, and our operations
are proceeding so Avell in Syria that we feel that there is no necessity to
press him unduly in this connection, but at any rate it is still most important
that he should maintain more effective control in Qasim and stop smuggling
and put real pressure on Shammar. To this end we are prepared to assist
him with 1,000 more rifles, 100.000 rounds, which Mr. Philby will place at
his disposal as necessity arises. He may also regard as a gift the advance
of two months’ subsidy made him by Mr. Philby.
“ As regards Hail, I do not consider Ibn Saudis really keen on taking it except in
circumstances which make it apparent that he is doing so at our bidding
and under our direction. At the same time, should good opportunity arise
for his doing so, either by diplomacy or force, with above meagre assistance,
I understand there would be no objection to it in principle, either on the
part of His Majesty’s Government or High Commissioner. If it should come
to pass, I think we should be prepared to double Ibn Sand’s subsidy or give
him good lump sum. I trust general approval will be telegraphed to our
proceeding on above lines, and that General Officer Commanding may be
authorised to supply rifles.”
3. The recent orders, conveyed in the Secretary of State’s telegram of 13th
September, laid it down that £ ‘ Bin Sand should be kept as quiet as possible and
“ should be restrained if possible from military activity or aggressive aciion in any
££ direction ; ” and that His Majesty’s Government were “against increasing his armed
strength or encouraging him to attack Bin Rashid at the present juncture.” In other
words, our attitude towards the Hail expedition has changed from somewhat
lukewarm support to actual discouragement. 4 * *
4. It may well be doubted whether Bin Saud would, in any circumstances, have
seriously pressed an offensive against Bin Rashid. But the policy of encouraging
him to pursue the project had at least the advantage of diverting his activities from
channels likely to bring him into collision with the King of the Hejaz. The enmity
between these two Arab chieftains is deep-seated. It reflects many years of rivalry
between Mecca and Riadh, aggravated by the personal jealousy between the two men
and by the sectarian feud between Sunni and Wahabi. King Husain, apart from
personal animosity, appears to be genuinely apprehensive of the spread of the
Wahabi movement, of which Bin Saud is the figurehead, in the direction of the
Hejaz. This feeling was probably at the back of his recent action at Khurma, which is
the immediate subject of dispute with Bin Saud. For the moment the situation is
eased. Bin Saud is reported to have found a temporary diversion in the Koweit
direction, where the Ajman and other tribesmen are engaging his attention ; while
the King, probably as a result of our representations, shows a disposition- not to
force the pace at Khurma. But we cannot count on more than a breathing space,
and the trouble between the two chiefs is certain to revive unless some modus vivendi
can be found between them.