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File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎407v] (400/602)

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The record is made up of 1 item (300 folios). It was created in 7 Aug 1918-26 Dec 1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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5 The statement printed as an appendix to tins Note shows the line that we have
taken with Bin Sand in the matter, and his own attitude towards our efforts to
promote reconciliation. The first question that arises is that of the proposed meeting
between the tiro Chiefs. King Husain has offered to visit his rival. Bin Sand
evidently regards the offer with suspicion, hut is piepaied to agiee to a meeting on
certain conditions. Mr. Philby fears that a meeting might lead to conflict rather than
reconciliation, and “would on the whole recommend that visit be not encouraged.”
Sir R. Win mite is strongly of opinion that a meeting between the two principals
“ could serve no useful purpose,” and emphasises the objection to withdrawing King
Husain for any considerable period from the personal direction of Hejaz affairs. He
is more favourably inclined, however, to an alternative suggestion made by the
Foreign Office that an interview should be arranged between one of the King’s sons
and a brother of Bin Sand, and he is taking steps to sound the King in the matter.
The result of these steps may perhaps be awaited.
6. The second question is that of British representation with Bin Sand. The
Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, has warned us that the result of the refusal of His
Majesty’s Government to replace the 1,000 unserviceable Winchester rifles presented
to Bin Sand may be that Mr. Philby will find his position an impossible one, and
that he will be compelled to terminate his mission and leave for the coast. In a
subsequent telegram Captain Wilson has suggested that Mr. Philby, whom he regards
as having “ reached the end of his tether,” so far as his mission to Nejd is concerned,
should be allowed to proceed on leave, and should be replaced by an officer from
Egypt, whose deputation “ would allay King Husain’s suspicions and put an end to
the belief that our Arabian policies are not co-ordinated.” In a still later telegram,
dealing with future British policy in Arabia as a whole, Captain Wilson recommends
that “it should now be ruled that, though the affairs of Bin Sand will continue to be
“ dealt with by His Majesty’s Government through Baghdad, henceforward any officer
“ sent to Bin Saud will normally be a selection t)f the High Commissioner, Cairo, who
“ will be kept for the present fully informed of all developments.” Without prejudice
to the question of a general ruling on the lines advocated by the Civil Commissioner,
the Department ventures to think that there is much to be said for a change of
representation with Bin Saud at the present juncture. In the first place, as explained
above, the policy which Mr. Philby was sent to Riadh to carry out has been modified,
and there seems advantage in making the new departure synchronize with the
appointment of a new agent. The latter will be more favourably placed than our
present representative, who is deeply committed to the old policy, for giving effect to
the revised instructions of His Majesty’s Government. Secondly, much benefit might
accrue from bringing ; a “new angle of vision” to bear upon the affairs of Bin
Saud. I here has been too much of a tendency in the past for the two rival chieftains
Bin Saud and King Husain to find their respective champions in India and Egypt,
and for the whole controversy between them to be reflected in a conflict of view
between the two gieat administrations concerned. It is scarcely to be supposed that
this aspect of the case, or the possibility of turning it to advantage, is lost upon the
c neftams themselves. I he appointment of an Egyptian officer to Riadh would do
much to correct these tendencies and to bring it home, both to Bin Saud and to the
King, that there is unity in the counsels of ilis Majesty’s Government.
7. Thirdly, there remains the question of the 1,000 rifles. The Department is
most reluctant to revive a proposal on which the Eastern Committee has twice
lecoided an adverse decision. • But Captain WTlson is strongly of opinion that our
N us fl |.° 7 * * 10 P tlC T ^ ^ ^serviceable rifles may have very unfortunate consequences;
i wi isgust Bin Saud and will alienate from him the sympathy of his adherents
wiio, even as it is are “by no means content with the results that have accrued from
ns espousal of the British cause.” The pressure of public opinion, as the Civil
om miss loner seems to hint, may even prove strong enough to override Bin Sand’s
Realty to ourselves. Captain Wilson also reports that the General Officer Com-
mandnig, Baghdad, agrees with him that the replacement of the 1,000 rifles is
expedient m present circumstances.” Attention is drawn to General Marshall’s
view because it was primarily on military grounds that the recent decision of His
. ajesty s Goveinment was based. The arguments for and against the supply of the
rifles were discussed m a previous Memorandum circulated to the Committee and it is
nut proposed to recapitulate them here. But it may be recalled that the proposition,

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Part 8 primarily concerns relations between Bin Saud [‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Sa‘ūd] and King Hussein of Hedjaz [Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī, King of Hejaz]. Included are the following:

  • discussion as to which ruler has the stronger claim to Khurma, and whether Bin Saud should be encouraged to begin hostilities against Bin Rashid [Saʿūd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Rashīd, Emir of Ha'il], as a way of diverting the former's attention from other matters;
  • copies of a treaty between the British government and Bin Saud, which was signed on 26 December 1915 and ratified on 18 July 1916;
  • debate about whether the British should supply Bin Saud with more arms and ammunition (to make amends for providing him with 1000 cheap Winchester rifles);
  • discussion of the possible benefits of arranging a meeting either between King Hussein and Bin Saud or between the former's son and the latter's brother;
  • discussion about the possibility of an officer from the Egyptian service succeeding Harry St John Bridger Philby as the British representative to Bin Saud;
  • reports of Bin Saud having begun operations against Bin Rashid, and discussion as to how the British should respond;
  • speculation on King Hussein's actions in Khurma and the implications for Britain's policy in the region;
  • a copy of a memorandum from the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department, entitled 'Memorandum on British Commitments to Bin Saud';
  • reports of an Ikhwan force advancing towards Mecca, and discussion as to how the British should respond.

This item features the following principal correspondents:

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File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎407v] (400/602), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/389/2, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100032845625.0x00001e> [accessed 28 March 2024]

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