File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎408r] (401/602)

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deficiency. It is to be feared that the whole transaction will wear an appearance of
sharp practice, which, m dealing with Arabs, it is most desirable to avoid. It may
here be remarked that the Civil Commissioner does not support Mr. Philbv’s proposals
for supplying Bin Sand with arms and ammunition on a further considerable scale ;
and in any case these pioposals, winch were framed on the assumption that Bin Sand
was to be encouraged to operate against Hail, are ruled out by the recent pronounce
ment of policy by His Majesty’s Government.
8. A few general observations may, perhaps, be added. As mentioned above,
the indications are that an early collision between Bin Sand and King Husain on the
Khurma question need not be anticipated. Probably both Chiefs have taken to heart
the warnings of His Majesty’s Government. General Allenby’s recent victory in
Palestine, the full extent of which is uncertain at the time of writing, should
have a steadying influence on the wdrole situation. It ought to remove from Bin Sand’s
mind any lingering suspicion that he has “ put his money on the wrong horse.” At
the same time, the contribution of the Hejaz forces towards the British success—if it
proves to be as considerable as the early reports seem to indicate—will serve to
emphasise the view, already plainly enunciated by His Majesty’s Government, that
King Husain’s services and commitments to the common cause are out of all
comparison with those of Bin Rand. This does not, of course, mean that we are to
disregard the latter’s just interests or to fail to carry out the terms of the treaty of
December 1915, under wdiich we (1) recognised his sovereignty over certain specified
areas, to _ be delimited hereafter ” ; and (2) guaranteed his territories against
“aggression bv any Foreign Ikwver.” But it does mean that we are on firm ground
in restraining him from extravagant claims against his rival, and in requiring him
to abstain from action likely to create strife and disunion among the Arab peoples.
9. To sum up, the Department ventures to recommend—
(i) that as regards the proposal to arrange a meeting between representatives
of Bin Saud and King Husain, a further report from Cairo should be
awaited ;
(ii) that Sir K. Wingate should be invited to depute an officer of the'Egyptian
service to succeed Mr. Philby as British representative with Bin Saud ;
(iii) that the question of supplying Bin Saud wdth 1,000 serviceable rifles in
substitution for the inferior weapons already delivered to him should be
considered.
J. E. S.
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
22nd September 1918.
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