'Territorial changes. Memorandum by the India Office' [‎75r] (3/10)

a foreign Goverument, ami British Indian Roman Catholics are constantly
memorialising and asking that they may be removed from foreign jurisdiction
(the last memorial is as recent as 18th May hist: Sir II. Howard, No. 41 of
T,' ' ", ne •. l | l ' ) - , 1I|IS . 18 ! he m01 'e anomalous in that the Republic of
I ortugal is violently anti clerical. • 1
1 . lo return to Arabia Italy was not a party to the Anglo-Russo-Krench
agreements regarding the Arab State, and while it is almost certain that she
wil object to the allotment of Mersina and Adana to France, it is possible
that she u ill also object to Article 10 (of M. Cambon’s note of 9 th May 1916)
u iicli is in iact directed against her, and which provides that “ Res
„ Houvernenients anglais et fran ? ais . . . se meltront d’accord pour no
pas acquem, et ne consentiront pas qu’une tierce Puissance acquiere, do
‘‘ possessions territoriales dans la peninsule arabique on construise une base
n a vale dans les lies snr la cote est de la mer Rouge.” And though she
may acquiesce in this, she may yet claim a sphere of influence, short of
territorial possession, *in the ^ emeu. Italian interests in that district have
hc( n t mphasised lately in llie imperialist press, c.g., TSidea ^azioucile, which
wrote on 23rd July that the really important matter is to secure the political
.oid i conomic influence of Italy m the ^emen, which is an indispensable
complement to Piitlnea. and asked il any other Rower could put in counter
claims (Sir R. Rodd, No. 231 of 24th July). Our policy, of course, is
“Arabia for the Arabs.” We have no counter claims; but we do not
recognise anyone else’s claims. The Arabs detest the Italians; and since
in the Turco-Italian war, the Italians supported the Idrisi Saiyid of Asir and
blockaded the coast of the 'i emen, it is hardly to be supposed that the Imam
of Sanaa—the Idrisi's mortal enemy and the dc facto Master of the Yemen —
would welcome them. 1 heir intrusion could only be a constant source of dis
turbance, and of inconvenience to us at Aden. For this reason, it is desirable
if possible to induce them to accept the Anglo-French agreement and to
abandon all claims in Arabia and the Red Sea by compensation elsewhere.
Possibly French Somaliland—if, as suggested in Section 3 above, the French
can be induced to quit it—might be allotted to them. But it would have
to be in return for a very binding agreement regarding the arms trallic ; for
no purpose will have been served if a French trade is merely to be replaced
by an Italian one.
8 . The Government of India discuss the question of Aden at some length,
but it is unnecessary to go into it in detail for the present purpose. The
only points to which reference need be made are ( 1 ), ( 2 ) and ( 6 ) in their
telegram. We have given assurances to the Arabs that we do not intend to
make annexations, and we have agreed jointly with the French not to do so—-
with the proviso, however, that “ Ceei n’empechera pas telle rectification de
“ la frontiere d’Aden qui pourra etre jugee necessaire, par suite de la recente
“ agression des Turcs ” (Article 10 of M. Cambon’s note referred to above).
This proviso was inserted for two reasons : (a) because it is not certain that
the existing frontier divides the tribes in the best possible way ; (b) because
we might find it necessary to take over Sheikh Said. This fortified pro
montory is within gunshot of our station on Periin Island, which has, in fact,
been bombarded from it during the war. We ejected the Turks in
December 1911, but allowed them to return, and they have been entrenched
there ever since. It may seem desirable, in order to make a repetition
impossible, and at the same time to secure Sheikh Said against French claim,
to annex the peninsula. The Government of India are content to leave it to
the neighbouring Arabs. In that case, we must induce the French formally
to withdraw their claim, whether in virtue of the terms of our agreement or
by offering them compensation elsewhere. Their claim dates from 1869,
when two Frenchmen purchased the place from the local Sheikh for $80,000.
The Porte denied the right of the Sheikh to sell, but the French, though
they occupied the place for a very short time, have never abandoned their
interest in it, and have always evaded recognising it as Turkish territory.
In 1893 M. Delonele urged in the Chamber the importance of occupying it;
and as recently as November 1914 a company styling itself the “Guest-