'Mesopotamia Administration Committee. Position of Chief Political Officer (Sir Percy Cox).' [‎146v] (2/6)

3. After further consideration of the subject by the Committee, the
Secretary Of State telegraphed as follows to the Government of India
and Sir Cox on the 10th May 1917
'‘His Majesty’s Government desire to assure you at once that they do
not contemplate immediate establishment of an Arab administration
on principles indicated in my telegram of 29th March. They fully
realise that military situation requires that Army Commander and
Chief Politics^ Officer should have free hand, but what they are
concerned about is that nothing that can be avoided should be done
during military occupation that would prejudice subsequent intro
duction of above-mentioned principles, and in particular establish
ment of separate administrative systems for Basra and Baghdad.
Subject to clear understanding on this point, Cox may carry on in
consultation with Army Commander as heretofore, until whole
problem has been examined and reported on by a Commission 1 as he
suggests. Such questions as administrative councils, permanent
judicial system, regulation of Indian immigration, Ac., are reserved
for consideration of Commission. Meanwhile only such minimum
of administrative efficiency should be aimed at as is necessary to
preserve order and meet needs of occupying force. Amendment of
laws and introduction of reforms should be kept within narrowest
possible limits.”
4. So far, as his telegram of the 7th April {see paragraph 2) indicates,
Sir P. Cox’s views were apparently in complete accord with those of General
Sir Stanley Maude. The first intimation of a difference of outlook between
them was conveyed in a “personal” telegram from Sir P. COX to the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , dated the 25th May 1917, in which he reported that the
position had become unsatisfactory from a political point of view. He
proceeded :—
“ General Maude’s military successes have established his reputation as a
soldier beyond all criticism, but he is purely a soldier and without
any previous experience of the East or of Orientals, and I find him, as
is only natural, unsympathetic and somewhat intolerant in regard to
political problems and unable to appreciate important bearing of
apparently simple problems of daily occurrence on larger political
and even military interests.
“ With the limited power which I at present possess as his Chief Political
Officer, which gives me no right to report to Government, and having
regard to his pronounced divergence of outlook, I find myself unable
to make good the undertaking which I have given to Government to
allow' nothing to be done calculated to prejudice their declared policy,
and I realise that if that policy is to be safeguarded I must be placed
in a stronger position vis-a-vis the Army Commander, and at any rate
be given right to send a regular report weekly or fortnightly to
higher authority to keep them au fait with current questions and at
large. As His Majesty’s Government are awmre, I have no ulterior
ambitions here, and am quite ready to resign if that course is
convenient to them, but if it is desired that I should remain, my
hands must be strengthened. If this could best be done by making
me High Commissioner nominally, I would no longer oppose it
provided it is understood that it does not connote any more extensive
introduction or Arab administration than was recently agreed upon,
but simply placing His Majesty’s Government in a better position
to keep themselves closely informed of political developments in the
new' territory.”
1 This refers to a proposal made by Sir P. Cox in his telegram of the 7th April (see para-
grapn -), and accepted by His Majesty s Government, that a “ Commission of tirst-rate men ”
should be sent out to Mesopotamia in the autumn of 1917 “to examine the whole problem on
the spot. r