'Aden. The political situation in the hinterland.' [‎150r] (1/2)

ADEN: The political situation in the Hinterland.
• 1 ie mdUary lustory °J the Aden Protectorate since the outbreak of
'vvai with l ui key may be very briefly related. News reached the Aden
authorities on the 12th June lOlo that lurkish forces were being concen-
tiated at Ma\ia, which lies just beyond the border of our protectorate, with
a yew to advancing, via Ad-dareja, upon Lahej, the headcpiarters of the
principal British protected chief of the Hinterland (the Abdali Sultan), and
situated only about 20 miles from Aden as the crow flies. On the 3rd July
news was received that Lahej was actually threatened by the Turks, who
had routed the Sultans levies, and the military authorities at Aden decided
to send up the local movable column for the protection of the town. The
torce reached Lahej but was unable to maintain its position there in the face
of superior enemy strength, and was compelled to retire upon Aden and to
leave Lahej to its fate. Two 10-pounder guns, several machine guns, and a
considerable amount of ammunition and equipment, were abandoned during
the retreat. I he Turks followed up their success, and the British troops
found it necessary to retire behind the defences of Aden itself, leaving
Sheikh Othman—whence Aden obtains its water supply—in the enemy’s
hands. General Younghusband was promptly despatched to Aden with
reinforcements, and had little difficulty in driving the Turks out of Sheikh
Othman and regaining control over the water supply; but he made no
attempt—nor has any attempt since been made—to advance upon Lahej
or to clear our protectorate of the enemy.
2. The situation in which we have had to acquiesce during the past two
years is anything but a satisfactory one. Indeed one of the main reasons
which prompted the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. in suggesting the transference of military
control was the hope that it might lead to more effective measures. It is
true that our position at Aden itself has never been seriously threatened ;
but we have had the humiliation of looking idly on, month after month, at
the occupation of our territory by the enemy, and of presenting to the
world a spectacle of inability to help either ourselves or our friends. There
may have been excellent reasons for this inactivity. But, locally, its political
results have been deplorable; and there is little hope that the political
situation will improve until we are in a position to take effective military
action. So far we have confined ourselves to attempting to induce the local
Arabs (Saiyid Idrisi, A:c.) to do for us what we have not found it convenient to
do for ourselves—a policy which, naturally, has not been very fruitful in
results. The Arabs have little love for the Turk, but so long as they
are doubtful Ikuv far we really mean business they will hesitate to commit
themselves irretrievably. They are moreover torn by internal rivalries and
dissensions. Little effective help can be expected from them until we take
the field ourselves. It seems indeed hardly reasonable to expect them to
declare themselves effectively against the Turks and on our side while we to
all appearances are too weak to do anything substantial ourselves.
3. There is one point on which it is desired to lay great emphasis. It is
all-important, from the point of view of our future relations with the Arabs,
that we should, before the war ends, ourselves expel the Turks by force of
arms from Lahej and the remainder of our protectorate. Victory elsewhere,
followed by a diplomatic withdrawal on the part of the Turks, will not suffice
for local purposes, and will not serve to re-establish our prestige or the belief
in our ability to protect our own interests and those of our friends. The
Arab, as has frequently been remarked, is impressed only by what passes
before his eyes.
4. It should be added that, according to the Indian military authorities,
there are only about three, or at most four, months in the year (November
to February) suitable, for climatic reasons, for military operations in the
Aden area.
Political Department, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
25th August 1917.
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