File 600/1905 Pt 3 'Aden Hinterland: Situation; Withdrawal of Political Agent from Dthala; Treaties with Haushabi, Kotaibi and Alawi chiefs' [‎184r] (363/508)

C415FD
67. At the present moment another proposal isunder the consideratien nf
Government concerning the partial assumption of jurisdiction within the Pro-
Arab LevTat V? . desira 1 blllt - v ot es'ablisMng various posts and patrols of an
Arab Levy at various places on the roads with a view to the preservation of order
WOR « Th T ° 1-6 Maj0 , r .f C0b ’ S Mem <»-™dum dated the 21st January
» 9 w ‘ i T ,i n una ; ded P ol . i<!e lds roads. He has tried and failed. ”
We shall he obliged hereafter to give armed assistance, and the harvest will
he an increase of dissensions, restlessness, insecurity of route and, as a resultant,
diminution of trade and again “ Blood feuds are a cherished heritage and we
have neither time npr the wish to interfere. Where, however, such tribal disturb
ances bring insecurity to the caravan route, the matter demands our attention
and action, ihe past policy of alternate inaction and vengeance may he rele
gated to a dead past. ” J
58. In the same memorandum he writes “ I would propose to replace my
present escort of 20 Aden Troopers under a Jamedar by an equal number of
Arabs, all picked men. I have nothing against the Aden Troopers who have a
distinct role in the Hinterland, but believe my work will he rendered easier in
every way by this change. These would be mounted so as to move with me in
the districts.”
59. He also writes “ Later the Levy idea might he enlarged so as to
include posts beyond the trade lines, but leading into them as conduits of com
merce” and in conclusion “ I would urge upon Government the advisabilitv of
close consideration of the vast potentialities this enlargement of my present
proposal offers and which, far more successfully than the grant to a few
of stipends, solves the problem of how economically and in return for work
rendered to settle the entire country-side and win over a democracy to its re
cognized heads.”
60. Before this Memorandum was drafted, Colonel Scallon had already
addressed Government on the subject in his letter No. 6269, dated the 15th
October 1905, where he wrote “ 1 need not add that the proposed assumption of
jurisdiction should include the raising of a regular and carefully recruited
tribal levy to police the trade routes and more important districts of the
Protectorate. But this I consider absolutely essential to the peace and pro
gress of the country even in the absence of special jurisdictional arrangement.”
61. The concluding paragraph of this letter is also worthy of quotation
“ To conclude I would remark that I am strongly of opinion that it is now
full time that more law and order were introduced within the limits of our
Protectorate, hut that in the case of the Abdali Sultan and of, perhaps, one or
two other Chiefs, 1 am inclined to think it preferable to secure this by Treaty
and special extradition arrangements rather than by direct assumption of
authority. As to the Subehi, Yafai and other sub-divided tribes where there
is no real central authority, I consider it preferable that we should now gradu
ally but firmly ourselves interfere to effect order, secure peace and promote
trade."
62. In regard to these more recent proposals one or two remarks seem
called for. The terms of Major Jacob’s reference to past policy as one of
alternate inaction and vengeance can certainly not be fairly applied to the
policy portrayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Merewether in 1865 and admitted by
General Hogg to have been successfully carried out up to 1886. Colonel
Merewether’s policy was by constant activity to avoid the necessity for venge
ance altogether.
63. Again, it is questionable whether any Arab Levy would really prove
efficient as a fighting body, as a body directly charged with the duty of preserv
ing order. The Arab Levy attached to the Aden Troop was reduced owing to its
lack of fighting qualities and also of amenability to discipline. The Sheikh
Othman Mounted Police cannot be said to he a body of proved efficiency. A
short time a^o one of the Sowars shot his superior officer dead. Colonel Stace
wrote in 1891 that they have never acted vigorously when required. And
this is an opinion which at the present day I am prepared to endorse. Again,
where punishment did prove necessary it may be doubted whether an Arab