File 600/1905 Pt 2 'Aden Hinterland: Future Policy' [‎285v] (58/226)

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he is convinced that he would suffer from the proposed withdrawal. Only
eighteen months ago the Amir entered into a treaty by which he was assured
that the British Government would extend to the territory of D’thala “ the
oracious favour and protection of His Majesty the King-Emperor ” ; and two
years a<m the Resident expressed his conviction that our vacation of D’thala
would immediately result in the Amir leaving the district and taking refuge in
Aden or Lahej, as his position would become untenable. Such a result would
lay us open to the charge of a breach of faith and of our treaty obligations.
The comments of the"Bombay Government on this opinion, contained in a
letter, dated the 28th August 1904, were as follows :—“ The Governor in Council
cannot but feel that it would he an incalculable advantage if the Resident
were placed in a position to reassure the Amir regarding our intentions. Such
reassurance would in all probability not only strengthen the Amir’s position,
hut would have a pacifying effect on the whole countryside. It is natural
that so long as the tribes have reason to believe that our influence will be
withdrawn in the very near future, they should maintain an attitude of
expectancy and take up a position which will enable them to secure every
possible advantage in the event of our withdrawal. The Amir’s position has
been strengthened, and it will remain secure so long as we remain at D’thala”.
In this connection we invite attention to the strongly expressed opinions of
the Bombay Government and of the Resident, with whom we desire fully
to associate ourselves.
The cases of the Haushabi Sultan, of the Upper Yaffai, and of the Nawo,
Rubeaten, and Dthabiani tribes are, as the Resident shows in paiagraph o of
his letter, not widely different from that of the Amir of D’thala; and to
abandon those who have cast in their lot with us and to whom we have
promised our countenance and protection appears to us unwise even if it can he
regarded as consistent with pledges we may fairly be considered to have given.
There is thus a real danger that, if we now withdraw, we may be confronted
in a few vears with an independent Arabia which will have lost faith in our
abilitv or willingness to keep our promises to our friends, and which will
therefore be contemptuous of or hostile to us. We submit that, at least until
the issue of the present struggle between the Turks and Arabs is known, it
would he impolitic in the highest degree for us to abandon our important post
of observation and control at D’thala.
13. We have now attempted to show that the withdrawal of our troops
and of the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. from D’thala will, both from a strategic and political
f point of view, gravely impair the strength of the fortress of Aden; while the
i disadvantages expected by His Majesty’s Government to result from a retention
of our position should, with the exercise of discretion and a loyal adoption or
1 the policy of non-interference, be easily avoided. On the general question we
view with grave concern the policy of withdrawal from the responsibilities
and obligations, which we have deliberately undertaken in the Aden Hinter
land, as likely to cause us future trouble of a serious nature in that region.
If Turkish intrigue and Muhammadan fanaticism are in the future to be ieit
uncontrolled in that country, we fear that we shall before loag be involved m
operations that might have been avoided by a firm and consistent attitude
towards the tribes, and we would, therefore, deprecate the proposed change m
policy as being, in our opinion, likely to bring about the very result that Mis
Majesty’s Government desire to avert. At the same time we fully recognise
that the shaping of a foreign policy especially in a matter affecting the European
Powers must rest with His Majesty’s Government, but we earnestly trust that
the decision of His Majesty’s Government upon this point may be reconsidered
in the light of the facts and arguments which we have now ventured to place
before you. In any case we would suggest that the present oppoituni y may
perhaps appear favourable for further examination of the question ot tne
transfer of Aden to the direct control of His Majesty’s Government, as
I presented in our despatch No. 66, dated the 14th May 1903, to which we aye
i received no answer. In that communication we pointed out the desirao i y
1 of uniting financial and political responsibility in the same hands; our °P ini .y^
1 then given is fully confirmed by the subsequent course of events; and witn
I the greatest respect for the views of His Majesty’s Governmen ne now