'GAZETTEER OF PERSIA. VOL. III. PART II: L to Z' [‎191r] (386/988)

QAS—QAS
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large bodies of troops, who could be supported without difficulty, on sup
plies drawn from the sedentary population, which will be found all over
Pars. They have no vast tracts of country abandoned solely to nomads,
as have all the other nomadic tribes of South-West Persia. They must
perforce live amongst a sedentary population, which greatly exceeds that
of the tribesmen in point of numbers. ”
Numbers.—In 1910 Chick estimated that Saulat-ud-Dauleh had 2 , 000,000
men under his command : but in 1912 he reckoned the number at 50,000
families (300,000 tribespeople) with 75,000 men capable of bearing arms.
This does not represent the number likely to combine in opposition either
to a tribal enemy or to an invader. Wilson in 1912 estimated that “ There
should be, in theory, about 30,000 fighting men at thedisposal,
and there are as a matter of fact probably not less than 15,000 modern
rifles in possession of his tribes, and half as many obsolete ones. But
no Ilkhdm has ever been able to collect and keep together more than 3,000
men at most. Sault-ud-Dauleh, acting with the approval and at the request
of the Governor-General, was unable to keep more than 2,000 men in the
field in support of the Nizam, in spite of the attractive prospect of the loot
of Shiraz, that he dangled before his men .* the season was moreover con
venient, and supplies from pillaged villages abundant. The maximum
number of men that an influential Ilkhdnl could hope to collect and keep
together at a favourable moment, such as, for instance, the month im
mediately preceding the migration to or from the plains, is 4,000 men.
Such a force could only be retained for a few weeks, and only when plen
tiful supplies were available locally. ”
Fighting qualities .—The men are of medium height, light, active, and
hardy. They are warlike in their traditions and tastes, good riders and
accustomed to firearms. The tribe could furnish good infantry men inured
to hard work over rough country, and requiring but little transport for their
few simple wants. General Gordon describes the horsemen encountered by
him in 1892 as a tough and rough irregulars mounted on small, wiry
horses. ”
The Qashqal are probably superior to the Bakhtiari as fighting men.
The mere fact that their losses in Shiraz during the autumn of 1911 3
amounted to over 400 killed and a proportionate number wounded, proves
that they are not deficient in courage of a sort; but their failure to make
an impression on the defences of the part of the town which they were
attacking, indicates that they are deficient in other qualities, which are
essential to a fighting man. It was noticeable that almost all Qashqai
losses were incurred during night attacks; and the fact that both sides,
Qashqal and Arabs, had recourse to mining and countermining is worthy
of record.
In any military operations against tbe QashqaTs the main factor to be
considered is that they are as a whole a migratory tribe, that their wealth
mainly depends on their flocks and herds and that any interruption or
stoppage of their annual migration would result in their losing much of
their live-stock owing to want of means of feeding them. They also own a
considerable number of villages in the lower ground, including a good many
belonging to the Qashhuli section in the vicinit of the Bushire-Shiraz
road. The districts occupied by them during they winter months extend