File 1569/1913 'Trans-Persian Railway' [‎126v] (263/594)

2. ihat the Russian Government would permit railway construction within the
limits of the Russian zone and the neutral zone near the Perso-Afcdian
frontier.
This attitude, if maintained by the Russian Government, would mean that
co-operation between Russia and England, so far as railway enterprise was concerned
in Persia, would practically be at an end, and that Great Britain would not be in a
position to have a voice in or to guide railway construction in the Russian sphere, and
would also experience great difficulty in opposing Russian railway construction in the
neutral zone. It is, moreover, quite possible that such construction would be dangerous
to British interests, both from the strategical and political points of view. It seems
therefore, desirable to see if it would not be possible to keep alive the Societd d’Etudes'
and thereby ensure that co-operation between Russia and England in regard to railway
enterprise in Persia should be continued and placed on a satisfactory basis.
In the memorandum communicated to Russia on the 14th February of this
year the British Government stated that the question of the linking-up of the Trans-
Persian Railway with the railways of India should remain for the present entirely
open. To this the Russian Government reply that, “ In consideration of the special
views still prevalent in Anglo-Indian political circles, the Russian Government find it
possible to agree to this point.” This reply, therefore, meets the British views, and in
any case defers the necessity of seriously considering a junction between the Persian and
Indian railway systems for some time to come.
The second desideratum of the British Government was that the southern terminal
point of the railway should be Bunder Abbas on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . To this the Russian
Government reply that Bunder Abbas as a terminal point is unacceptable, and suggest
that either Chahbar or Guattar would be more suitable and convenient ports. The
information in the possession _ of the Admiralty is to the effect that neither of these
ports could possibly be made into convenient ports of call or serve as terminal ports of
the railway without enormous expenditure of money. There is, however, an anchorage
about 25 miles to the west of Bunder Abbas which affords every convenience for
embarking and landing merchandise and passengers. This is in the Clarence Straits
which are at this point completely sheltered in all seasons, affording a good harbour
where steamers of any size could discharge and embark goods either alongside jetties
for the construction of which the locality is suitable, or by lighterage, which would be
much less difficult than at Chahbar or Guattar. It is considered that if it were pointed
out to the Russian Government that the only really suitable port is in the Clarence
Straits they could not insist upon the roadsteads which they have mentioned as being
ocahties which could be advantageously made use of for the purposes required.
Our consent to the line proceeding to Kerman might be made conditional on
Clarence Straits being included in the British sphere.
i fV 1 * 1 Bri ^ lsil desideratum was that the alignment of the future railway
C i f 3 ! Viw! 1 .’ s Pf ia , n ’ Shiraz, and Bunder Abbas, while the Russians desire that
1 + S1 fi U + n < f? a ’ lverman 5 ar >d Chahbar. I he Bussian memorandum points
out that the British alignment would considerably lengthen the main line, would
entail increased cost of construction of over 5,000,000/. and greatly decrease the transit
importance of the line, and would leave on one side the populated provinces of
Kerman and Yezd. r r r
i • ^ n ^f l d^paf^ental Committee were fully aware of the military objections
vluch have been raised to the Yezd-Kerman route. Supposing, nevertheless, that
ussians were to concentrate within four months a large body of troops at
Kerman, it does not seem very clear how they would utilise this force, even on the
assumption that a railway was m existence between Kerman and the southern coast.
Uiere would be no reason for their proceeding to the coast, where they could effect
nothing, and to march eastwards across the desert would present great difficulties.
R ap - peai>S t iat H ! s Ma jestys Government have no effective means of
Z7 e ^ the a rai ! W ^ Kerman witho ^ their co-operation,
n< t -V C ;: nilr 'i ttee submit that the military aspects of the whole situation require
ieconsideration horn is point of view Subject to the result of this reconsideration, it
appears to the Committee that as the Russian Government are ready to make a
r“rYT' d \ n^u^ 811 desideratum, and, as there is considerable
force m the objections which they have raised to the British alignment, the alignment
Tezd Kerman to the coas. westofjffinder Abbas could be accepted without incurring
any leal risk to British mterejmCp^^ that it is clearly understood that railway
construction would be commenced from the coast northwards to Kerman simultaneously