File 1569/1913 'Trans-Persian Railway' [‎244v] (499/594)

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I
f
{d)
That on commercial grounds the Bampur-Kerman route is the
best, especially as a recent railway reconnaissance shows that
this route is feasible at a reasonable cost.
That as regards the northern portion of the railway an alignment
through Ispahan or the connection of that pla-ce with the mam
line by the shortest feasible branch line is desiiable.
(f) The site of the break of gauge should be situated as far from
India as possible and located not nearer than the middle of the
neutral sphere.
(a) That a 3' 3f" gauge on the southern section of the railway should
be adopted as most suitable on military and financial grounds.
(h) That the main line throughout Persia should be international and
that the construction and working of the section from Karachi
up to the Persian border as well as of the suggested branches
between Bigan and Bandar^ Abbas and Bampur and Sistan,
respectively, should be in British hands.
3- It will be seen that for the reasons stated in theii report, the Com
mittee have gone somewhat further than the immediate points raised by
JVii\ Webb and have re-examined in the light of fuller information now in our
possession, the general question of alignment, On this question, as the^ report
shows, the issue is practically reduced to a conflict between commercial con
siderations which demand the alignment via Kerman, and military consider
ations which demand the alignment Bandar Abbas. His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief considers that the construction of this railway will
entail increased military responsibility on India, but if a railway cannot he
resisted in the Russian and neutral spheres of Persia, he is of opinion that the
Bandar Abbas alignment is the least objectionable on military grounds, and
although there are military objections to a branch line to Kerman this might
be agreed to, provided this concession is necessary to secure the alignment of
the main line being taken via Bandar Abbas.
As regards the extension from Bandar Abbas to Karachi, a metre gauge
line along the coast would, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief thinks, be
the least objectionable. If the main line ended at Bandar Abbas, it would do
so at a point which we might reasonably hope to control by naval and military
measures well within our power, while this solution will meet the chief com
mercial interests of the countries concerned and still leave a natural barrier of
800 miles of difficult country between it and Karachi. His Excellency is,
therefore, on military grounds, opposed to this extension being made, but if
this cannot be resisted, he considers the coast alignment from Bandar Abbas
to Karachi the least objectionable of all those that have been suggested.
4. We cannot help feeling some doubt whether in view of the facts put
forward by the Commander-in-Chief as to the forces required to resist a
Russian advance in Afghanistan, it would be possible to spare even the amount
of troops required for effective operations against an advance between
Bandar Abbas and Karachi. If this were so, it has been argued that military
considerations might be altogether abandoned. There are, however, certain
factors involving some measure of uncertainty, as for instance the eventual
decision of His Majesty’s Government in regard to the location of a naval
base at the mouth of the Gulf in regard to which Your Lordship recently
consulted us, and the exact attitude of the Admiralty in the matter of naval
operations along the Mekran Coast. Until we have full information as to the
intentions of His Majesty’s Government in regard to the naval and military
measures they are prepared to adopt at the entrance of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and
the measures which the Admiralty would be prepared to take in the event
of war in regard to the coast line from Bandar Abbas to Karachi, we scarcely
feel ourselves in a position to commit ourselves definitely to an opinion as to the
two alignments proposed. We would prefer, therefore, to deal w r ith the question
as a whole including the other points raised by Mr. Webb and the subsidiary
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