'The future of Constantinople. Memorandum by Lord Curzon. Printed for the War Cabinet, January 1919.' [‎18v] (2/4)

On the other hand it was urged that the disappearance of tne lurk wnne
removing an admitted ill, will introduce a number of new and unforeseen
complications in its place ; that if his claws be clipped, and all power of offence taken
away he will become an innocuous if not a positive respectable creature, that,
once ’ his friendly relations with ourselves are resumed, he may even provide a
benevolent buffer between the ambitions of Europe and our own Eastern possessions ;
that his expulsion would be a grave outrage to Mohammedan sentiment throughout
the world, and more particularly in India, where the successive blows under which the
Sultan and his dominions have reeled in recent years are said to have created an
unfavourable impression, and where this final sentence would be regarded as a crue
affront to Islam, prepared or connived in by Great Britain, the second greatest
Mohammedan power in the world. #
In reply, however, to these forebodings, it was pointed out by many who have
direct knowledge of India that the Indian Mohammedans have never attached any
particular sanctity or reverence to Constantinople : that they have grown accustomed
to the gradual diminution of the Ottoman power in Europe and Africa ; that they have
borne without excitement his expulsion from the Holy Places in the present war,
that they have even fought against the Turkish armies in more than one campaign;
and that they evinced neither astonishment nor regret when the intentions of the
Allies with regard to Constantinople were announced to the world. So far indeed from
being surprised by their fulfilment, they would be more likeiy to regard it as a mar k of
Allied weakness or of the Sultan s diplomatic triumph if they were now abandoned. In
this contest it was remarked that the present attitude of the 1 nrk at Constantinople,
and his evasions and pretexts in respect of carrying out the armistice, are an eloquent
confirmation of the position which he may be expected to assume should his adversaries
be so weak or so foolish as to spare him.
The question of the removal of the Turk was to some affected by considerations of
the identity of his successor ; inasmuch as some, who were in favour of expulsion on the
merits, were disposed to qualify their views, unless satisfied as to the substitute b\
whom he would be replaced.
II.
This brings me to the second question—viz., whether, in the event of the disappear
ance of the Turk, any foreign Power could profitably or safely be put in his place.
President Wilson is believed to favour the selection of some neutral State. I here is
no such State possessing either the prestige, the influence, or the resources that would
justify it for the task ; and the placing of Constantinople in the hands of a weak Power
^ would be not an avoidance but an encouragement of future trouble. Moreover, the
selection of any such State w r ould result in the embittered jealoysy of those minor
Powers who have for long aspired to the inheritance. Of these, Bulgaria was thought
at one time, in the early stages of the first Balkan war, to have a good chance, but she
forfeited it by her errors in the second Balkan campaign, and by her conduct in the
recent war. Her selection would now be impossible, and would arouse the undying
animosity ofRoumania and Greece.
The latter Power could only be chosen at the cost of similar heart burnings. She
has no claim for so immense an increase of authority, which her slender military
and naval resources would render her powerless to maintain, and the smaller but still
considerable extension of territory wdiich she is likely to receive as the result of the
war should more than satisfy both her ambitions and her deserts.
Of the Great Powers France is already, as reported in the daily telegrams,
endeavouring by every manner of means to establish a position of predominance in
Constantinople, and, in the imperialistic spirit by which she appears to be animated,
would doubtless clutch at a prize which would crown her position as the mistress of
the Near East. These pretensions could not possibly be acquiesced in by Great
Britain, and would meet with the relentless opposition of Italy.
For similar reasons Italy would not be tolerated either by France or by ourselves.
Great Britain, because of her traditional policy and her great Eastern connections,
would in some respects be the most suitable heir to the Turk, and the choice would
probably be more acceptable than any other to the Eastern world. But the main
duties and responsibilities of Britain lie elsewhere ; she will emerge from the war with
an increase of obligations which she will with difficulty sustain ; and no British Govern
ment would dream of adding to them by the assumption of so vast and perilous a charge.
There remains America. This solution has been urged by many, who are not
merely anxious that the United States should take their share in bearing the burden of the