File 364/1913 'Persia: situation in Fars (attack on 39th Central India Horse)' [‎29v] (63/522)

I quite understand and fully approve the Governor-Generafs idea of forming a,
force of some 1,000 picked men, and no doubt it would be ideal if such a force could be
put under some British officer having the gift of inspiring Persians with confidence.
Here again there is a hateful “ but.” I cannot think that it would be possible to have
two military forces in one place commanded by foreign officers of different nationalities. ^
The situation thus created would, I think, lead to endless jealousy and trouble. The ^
Governor-General would naturally seek to enrol the best men, and the Swedes would
cry out that he was favouring the corps under British officers at their expense. It
would hardly be fair on the Swedes to declare them a failure at Shiraz. Such a deck-
ration would affect their position vitally throughout Peisia, and if they are to lemam at
Shiraz, the idea of British officers for a separate corps must, X think, be abandoned
until their failure has been proved. I v/ould prefer a scheme which would mean a force
of from 3,000 to 4,000 men, under Swedish officers, to do general as well as gendarmerie
work. Such a force would require a large sum of money for its maintenance, but should
suffice to entirely restore order. Were His Majesty’s Government to put up 200,0001.
or 300,0001. as a debt on the Persian Government to maintain such a force effectively
for three years it would cost much less than an expedition.
I am quite aware that the presence of the Anglo-Indian troops at Shiraz may be
held responsible, in a way, for the situation, but they are there, whether or no it was a
mistake to send them there, and it is our duty, I think, to see that they are treated
with courtesy and honour. They at least cannot be held responsible for the repeated
outrages on caravans and for the persistent blackmailing that prevails.
As to the financial agent, I doubt very much if the Governor-General would be
more ready in his heart to accept the assistance and advice of an Englishman rather
than that of a Belgian. When Lecoffre was appointed he said that he would not go to
Shiraz unless his appointment was cancelled. He is a Persian of the old school, who
can with difficulty brook interference in what he considers to be the governor’s
functions. He is an intelligent and pleasant man, but he is not a good man of business,
nor is he an easy man to deal with when he considers his own prerogative at stake.
Being an honest man himself, he knows that he would administer the finances of the
province as well as he could, but he has dishonest men round him, and the two Govern
ments have undertaken to support a financial administration conducted by Belgians, in
the hope that such a scheme may produce permanent good. The fact that we have
advanced 15,000L to the Persian Government for the expenses of the administration of
the province would not justify us in asking for a separate financial control which would
have far-reaching results. To succeed in his task Mornard must have his own men that
he knows and trusts, and who are trained in his methods. I much hope that you will
find Stas better than you expect.
Your telegram No. 213 just received. You will have gathered from the above
that I approve the idea of a special force, but in my opinion, subject to the approval of
of the home Government, such a force, if officered by foreigners, should be organised by
the Swedes.