File 364/1913 'Persia: situation in Fars (attack on 39th Central India Horse)' [‎45v] (95/522)

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here that Persia, Baluchistan, and Luristan have passed permanently out of the hands
of the Central Government, and that in bars also the disease has advanced past the
point of recovery, and that the Persian Government is never likely to regain effective
control^ ^ a kove attitude of mind that I expressed the view that our com
mercial interests and position could be sufficiently vindicated by our assuming control
over Bushire-Shiraz road, and that we could then leave the administration of
province and the general restoration of order to its fate, hoping, once divested
of responsibility for the road, the Governor-General might find his hands strengthened
for other problems. By financing the administration indefinite!} as well as gendarmerie,
without full control over either, the British exchecpiei seem to be assuming a more
risky liability than would be involved in the holding of the road and on promising less
advantage to our commerce. . ,
“If, however, owing to its probable effect on Russia s attitude His Majestys
Government finally decide against taking any military action themselves, I venture
most respectfully, but earnestly, to urge that a searching diagnosis should be made of
financial position and outlook, and of complete decrepitude of the administrative
machinery of the country in spite of factitious journalistic statements to the contrary;
and that, having made it, we should take upon ourselves deliberately and constructively,
at whatever cost and for whatever period may be necessary, such measures of finance
as the diagnosis may show to be essential for the cure of the patient, if that is possible,
and for the preservation of our larger and ultimate interests.
“I venture, further, to urge that, as soon as our final decision has been
arrived at, or at any rate as the spring approaches, the policy on which we have
deliberately decided should be stated in Parliament, or published in the press, and
that we should then form our local dispositions accordingly, whatever temporary loss
of credit it may involve.
“ (Addressed to Foreign [?] Department, India; repeated to Minister.)”
Cox states that the gendarmerie officers at Bushire are of opinion that a punitive
expedition against the tribes is a sine qua non of the success of the gendarmerie
scheme for Fars.
I do not think colonel commanding shares this view. He attaches some
importance to the co-operation of such local forces as the Governor-General may
be able to collect, but neither he nor I anticipate that a force capable of undertaking
a punitive expedition alone against the powerful tribes concerned can be formed. All
that is hoped is that the gendarmerie may be able gradually to reduce the province to
order, and exact punishment of men of tribes who may be proved guilty.
My latest advices are to the effect that the decision not to endeavour to bring up
the gendarmerie arms and ammunition from Shiraz for the present has seriously
affected the Governor-General’s plans, has caused the Dariabegi to abandon contem
plated expedition against Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli, reported in my telegram
No. 648 , and has obliged him to return to Shiraz without effecting
anything. The British consul at Shiraz reports that this has greatly damaged the
prestige of the Governor-General, and that Kawam has commenced to intrigne against
him with a view to prevent recruits offering themselves or arrears of taxes to be
collected.
I do not share the views expressed that, when the three years have elapsed within
which it is hoped that the gendarmerie will have restored order, the revenues of the
province will not suffice to meet the expenses of administration and of the gendarmerie.
Possibility of re-establishing order is perhaps very doubtful, but the richest province
in Persia should be self-supporting if this can be achieved.