File 930/1912 'Mohammerah - Khoremabad Railway' [‎126v] (259/396)

4
25
Net revenue anticipated by the
Consortium is ...
Taking the Rouble a8=Rs. 1-9-0 in
Indian currency, the net revenue will be
Taking working expenses at fi0°/ o the
gross earnings, to secure this revenue must
be ... ••• ••• •••
The length of the line from Baku to
Nushki being 2,150 versts or 1,400 miles,
in order to produce the gross receipts
above given, the line must earn per mile
per week the sum of ... •••
Roubles.
1,18,00,000
Bb.
1,85,00,000
4,62,00,000
655
tbroueh the ports of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and we have little doubt that the construction of line,
from those ports into the interior would be of much greater benefit from the purely commercal
point of view than the construction of the through line. We may note here that we are
unable to accept as in any way accurate the the L ZZ
the calculations shown in the margin it would
appear that the estimate of the Consortium ia
based upon the assumption that the proposed
hoe will earn per mile per week the sum of
Rs. 655. Judging by the earnings obtained
upon our Indian frontier railways, we anticipate
that the gross earnings per mile per week
over the whole of tbe proposed line can hardly
be expected to exceed Rs. 120 per mile per
week or |th of the Consortinm'a estimate.
The estimate given by the Consortium of the
cost of construction is also, in our opinion, an inadequate allowance. Persia is a mountainous
country, labour will be scarce and communications during construction didicult. With a
line of the character proposed large profits will bi expected from con tractsand the supply of
material, and judging from the cost of lailway construction in country of a similar character m
India, we fear that the cost of the proposed Trans-Persian connection will exceed the estimate of
the Consortium by at least 50 per cent. The proposed line can, therefore, hardly be expected
to prove a financial success. At the same time the existence of a railway which would
open no the country could hardly fail to produce a general expansion of trade in Persia.
Improved communications will mean the gradual removal of those obstacles to commerce
arismo- from the disturbed state of the country; from the difficulties relating to exchange
and remittance; the long delays between the placing and execution of orders; and the
impracticability of efficient supervision and control of agencies. But we cannot avoid the
conclusion that a line following the route proposed by the Consortium would be far more
advantageous to Russian than to Indian trade, though this result might be neutralised
to some extent if we were able to secure that branch lines shon'd be simultaneously
constructed to connect the Gulf ports, such as Bandar Abbas and Bushire, with the mam
line. We also consider that it would be essential that stipulations should be insisted upon
to insure that there shall be no differential treatment on any part of the railway for the
nationals of any country in respect of rates, fares or general facilities.
4. While, therefore, from the point of view of military policy there can be little question
that the maintenance of the status quo would be preferable to the construction of the proposed
railway, and while it seems at least doubtful whether the advantages to Indian trade would be
at all commensurate with the advantages which would accrue to Russian trade with Persia, or
with the financial outlay involved in the undertaking, we are nevertheless of opinion that
having regard to the desirability of meeting the wishes of the Russian Government and the
importance of obtaining a due share in the control of any railway that may be made in
Persian territory, and in view of the opportunity which now offers of obtaining conces
sions for branch lines which are important to us, both strategically and commercially, jbe
Government of India will be well advised to accept in principle the proposals of the Russian
Consortium, subject to such conditions in respect of alignment, branch lines, &c., as may be
considered necessary to secure the safety of India and the development of Indian trade.
Alignment of
the main
through line.
5. We will now proceed to examine in detail the various proposals which have been
made and to set forth the conditions which we consider to be essential before the Government
of India agree to participate in tbe proposed undertaking.
The first question to be considered is that of the alignment of the main through line
between Russia ani India. With the northern portion of the alignment between Baku and
Yezd we are only remotely concerned, but we think it right to notice that the alignment
proposed by tbe Consortium, viz., Tehran, Kum, Kashan, Ispahan and Yezd, is preferable on
commercial grounds to the direct line from Tehran to Kerman proposed by the Russian
Government, since the latter would leave untapped the important trade centres of Kum,
Kashan and Ispahan.
6. From the Indian point of view the important part of the alignment is that by which
the railway approaches the frontier of India, namely, the portion from Yezd onwards. Three
alternative routes have been suggested, namely,—
(1) The proposal of] the Consortium, which is also favoured by Sir Henry McMahon,
for a line from Yezd to Kerman and thence across the desert to Seistan and
Nushki. Length approximately 810 miles.
(2) The route suggested by Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, viz., Yezd, Kerman, Bam,
Regan, Bampur, Sarbaz, thence across the Perso-Briti«h frontier near Kej
and thence to Karachi or Hyderabad. Length approximately 1.117 miles.
(3) Tbe route advocated by the Indian General Staff, viz , Yezd to Bandar Abbas
and thence along the coast to Karachi. Length approximately 1,34)1
miles.