File 930/1912 'Mohammerah - Khoremabad Railway' [‎127r] (260/396)

The relative advantages and disadvantages of these three routes are examined in the
succeeding paragraphs:—
If the object of the proposed railway be taken as the connection of Russia with India (1) Yesd-Ker-
by the quickest, cheapest and easiest route, this alignment seems to be preferable to S an ;? ? 4 8 ^ n “
either of the other two which have been suggested. The distance between Yezd and ment. 1 *
Nushki via Kerman and Seistan is 810 miles only as compared with 1,147 and 1,341
miles between Yezd and Karachi by the other two routes: and although Karachi is
immeasurably superior to Nushki as a point of junction with the Indian railway system and
as a distributing centre for goods, the difference in length between the Nuskhi and Karachi
routes remains an important factor in the situation. There would, it is true, be engineering
difficulties to surmount in crossing the mountains which surround Kerman, and the scarcity
of fresh water in the desert between Kerman and Nasratabad and between Robat and
Nushki might also be a source of considerable inconvenience. But the route lies in the
main through flat country which, as would appear from the reconnaissance made by
Mr. Johns in 1903, would present few obstacles to railway construction. It is also a point in
favour of this alignment that it would give access to the rich and well-watered tract of
Seistan, which, in the opinion of so well-informed an authority as Sir H. McMahon,
is capable of rapid development if a market can be found for its surplus products.
But against these advantages have to be set objections, both strategical and political,
the importance of which can hardly be overstated. To take the political objections first—
it cannot be doubted, in view of the attitude taken by the Amir of Afghanistan towards tho
Anglo-Russian Convention, that His Majesty will regard the construction of a railway along
his southern border as a further indication of a design on the part of Russia to impair his
independence, if not to absorb his territories. This aspect of the question has been touched
on by Sir H. McMahon in paragragh 15 of his report, but with all respect to his authority
we doubt whether he has adequately recognised the gravity of the objection to the
Seistan-Nushki alignment on this score. However baseless the idea may be, there
will not be wanting advisers who will put a sinister construction on the project in its relation
to Afghanistan and w • fear that the alarm and suspicion that will be engendered may give
rise to tribal excitement which may prove beyond Hss Majesty's power to control. The
construction of the line would in fact prove to be a potent instrument in the hands of those
who make it their business to sow ill-feeling between the British Government and the ruler
and people of Afghanistan, and we apprehend that the process of restoring confidence might
involve us in undesirable complications with the other Powers who will be interested in the
undertaking. Even if this be avoided, there is the risk that trouble may arise between
ourselves and the Amir over the distribution of the water of the Helmand on which the
development ef Seistan largely depends.
The strategical objections to the Seistan-Nushki alignment are even more cogent. The
adoption of this route would give to Russia a railway leading directly to the frontier
of Afghanistan, and would enable her, in the event of war, to turn the Kandahar and
Quetta positions. It would also facilitate the transportation by Russia of a very large
army across two almost waterless deserts—a task which, under present conditions and without
the help of a railway, may be regarded as practically impossible of accomplishment. As
against this, India would receive no compensating strategical advantages. A line *.o Seistan
from Nushki might to some extent assist India to control Western Afghanistan, but no point
is offered from which a force from India could undertake offensive operations against
Russia; while the extension of our line to Seistan would make it difficult to resist a claim
on the part of Russia to connect the Trans-Caspian Railway with the proposed route,
in which case she would be able to concentrate from two directions. Finally, the adop
tion of the Seistan-Nushki alignment would, owing to its distance from the sea coast,
completely neutralise the strategical advantage which Great Britain possesses in her naval
supremacy.
These objections are, in our view, of so grave a character that the Government of India
would be justified in offering the strongest opposition to the proposal for railway connection
between Russia ana India via Kerman, Seistan, and the Nushki route.
7. We will now consider the advantages and disadvantages of the other two alignments (2) Yezd-Ker-
which have been suggested, namely, Yezd-Kerman-Bam-Bampur-Kej-Karachi and Yezd- man-Bam-Bam-
Bandar Abbas-Karachi, and would preface our remarks by explaining that information regard- chi'*a"ni"(^)Yezd
ing these two routes is confined to that obtainable from the route books, which furnish very Bandar Abbas-
inadequate material for judging the suitability of the routes they describe for railway construe- Karachi align-
tion. Our recommendations must, therefore, be considered as subject to modification after m 0hts.
actual railway surveys and investigations have been made.
It.is obvious in the first place that the political and strategical objections which apply
to the Seistan-Nushki alignment do not apply with the same force to either of the routes
above mentioned. A line connecting Kerman or Bandar Abbas with Karachi would be far
removed from the Afghan border and would not excite the apprehensions of the Afghan
people in any acute degree, while the selection of the sea coast route would enable Great
Britain to make effective use of her naval supremacy in resisting any possible hostile attack
by way of the proposed railway. It would also, as Colonel Cox points out, provide effective
means for checking the arms traffic through Mekran. These considerations, in our opinion.