File 930/1912 'Mohammerah - Khoremabad Railway' [‎135v] (277/396)

Finally, * -ems improbable
secure the safety of the railway i u , •, V a ][ ef ] on to send troops to
molestation by the tribesmen; we might easily be called o th ^ h
- -
b - “rS.«of .h. * >15 Sw ^ t ;*7.? r X,‘
and it is upon an increased export trade t be ga f d that Turkish obstruction
increase in the volume of our uupor . J , ^ • ^ ce p e lina l C )le to guarantee
“ofofthTBTghaTsectb/rould enable us to prevent differential rates on the
Mow “tfe* constnietion'of tTraffld! this is undoubtedly " ^
presupposes the restoration and maintenance of order in South-western Fersia,
consummatioytiUfar gagdadt'Konnanshah Railway will have the same
effect^at a mmimum of expense and without the political and financial risks that, it has
been suggested, of ra ii way u p 0 n the Sheikh of Mohammerah, it may be
held tat, as in the past so in the future, he will adapt himself to a ^ n C1 ™ U “ r S “’
•**
COn Trry“^:n^ tenttlPekt
Tudia it is undesirable that a connection should be made by rail between Central Persia
and the head of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , but such considerations apply with greater force to
the Trans-Persian Railway, which, it is understood, has been accepted m principle y
te Government of India 7 ,’subject to proper safeguards. In any case, as long as w
have naval predominance in the Gulf, the Luristan Railway ^
Russia, more particularly if its terminus be at Mohammerah, up the Shatt-el-Arab
T>iver and not at Kbor IVIusa. . -i xt-.^
It may also be argued, on the other hand, that ‘‘the time may come wRen the
power of rapidly movin| a force to Tehran or its neighbourhood by so short a route
from India may be of great advantage” (memorandum by Major Baird, D.b.O., date
the 5 th June, 1907, printed by chief of staff’s division, India). Such prospective va u
to us seems however, very problematic, as also its_ military value to Russia, an
not think that we need have any serious apprehensions as to the strategical effec o e
line ’g° n k^i 0 e S1 opinion, after weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the
Parisian line is that the best course for us would be to build the Mohammerah-Dirful
Railway as soon as possible and connect at once by a well-built road to Khoremab
an<1 FroTDizful to Hamadan by road is about 250 miles, from Bagdad to Hamadan
about 325. We shall, then, be able to land goods at Hamadan at all events as c py
via Dizful as we are now able to do via Bagdad, and far more expeditious^. JV hen t
railway is completed as far as Bagdad we should then, and no i e S.’, S -i • i,- ur
Dizful-Khoremabad section, in anticipation of the prolongation to Khamkm bemg
built,* should we by this time have been forced to give up hope of controllmg. the
Bagdad section, predominance on which would render the construction of the Lu
line in my view, superfluous, in view of the political objections to it.
There is, I understand, a possibility of the main line passing through Khanikin to Bagdad.