File 930/1912 'Mohammerah - Khoremabad Railway' [‎139v] (285/396)

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north lie great marshes, impassable on loot for eight months m the year extending half
way to Ahwaz. No measures could ever make Khor Musa a habitable port m my
belief, and were the railway to be brought down to the coast at this spot the vast
proportion of goods traffic would still find an outlet from Mohammerah, the Karun
River steamers being used between Mohammerah and Ahwaz and mce versa. It goes
without saying that no passengers would ever want to go to Khor Musa, and receipts
under this head would be negligible. , j • i • * 4 .^
The climate of Mohammerah in summer leaves much to be desired, m spite of the
amenities afforded by ice, fruit, and fresh vegetables in plenty ; but that ot Khor usa is
tryinc to a degree which only those who have visited it (as I have) on severa! occasions
during the summer months, can realise. The muddy shore into which the feet sink ankle
deep at every step, is impregnated with salt, and becomes so hot that no native can wa
barefoot on it; and for a European thick boots alone can save him from acute discomfort.
Stinging gnats and flies from the adjacent marshes swarm by night and would make
sleep impossible were it not for the fatigue caused by the long sweltering day. Hot
winds blow by night as well as by day. , ,
Every consideration, I submit, points to Mohammerah and not Khor Musa as the
proper terminus, and I have worked on this assumption throughout I quite realise, o±
course, that it is desirable for us to have a blocking option, irrespective 01 Khor Musa,
for political and strategical reasons.
30. Position of Sheikh of Mohammerah in regard to Baihvay in Arahistan.
The Sheikh of Mohammerah may he expected, in view of his close relations with
the British Government, to co-operate with the latter in any scheme proposed by them
for a railway through his territories. As the chief of a hegemony of all the Arab tribes
in Arabistan, and responsible for their attitude to the Persian Government, it is upon
him that we must rely to maintain order and prevent tribal animosities from impeding
the progress of operations; the experience of ten years shows that he will not fail to o
so. But his position as landowner must also be borne in mmd. He holds farmans
granting to him, among other districts, that of Mohammerah, which extends up to the
west bank of the Karun, to a point a few miles north of Sab’eh.
From this point to Shush, 15 miles south of Dizful, the proposed alignment passes
through the following districts, all of which are claimed, under farmans of the Shah by
the present Nizam-es-Saltaneh,nephew 7 of the late Husain Kuli Khan, Nizam-es-Saltaneh,
to whom they were originally granted. They are all leased to Sheikh Khaz al:
(1.) Karun west hank.
(2.) Kut Nahr Hashim.
(3.) ’Anafijeh.
(4.) Hussainabad.
It would probably be easy to obtain unirrigated land free of cost, and thus reduce
the cost of acquisition of land to a small figure, as the railway would pass through
irrigated land only at the terminus, Mohammerah, and near Dizful.
° Were it decided to commence construction of this line the first step would be to
conclude an agreement with the sheikh by which he undertook responsibility^ for the
safety of tiie line, and granted the necessary land at a fixed price. The Nizam-es-
Saltaneh might be left to put in his claim for compensation in respect of the cultivated
lands or the lands intermittently cultivated which have been appropriated for the use of
the railway and which he may claim as his own.
The lands in the neighbourhood of Shush belonging to the Nizam, have been leased
to a Russian subject for twenty-five years, but he is not likely to be in a position to
raise serious difficulties, and his lands could be avoided if necessary by keeping west of
the Shaur till Shush was passed, or by keeping east of the Diz, crossing it again
near Dizful.
' 31. Possible Tribal Opposition outside Sheikh's Territories.
I think it improbable that any serious opposition to the construction of the line, or
of any serious attempt to interfere with it wffien constructed, would be experienced. A
hundred armed men supplied by the sheikh would be ample to protect the camps from
occasional raiding parties of trans-frontier Arabs, and the Persian Government could be
induced to consent to the employment of pioneers from India, their double role of
workmen and soldiers would stand them in good stead and probably greatly facilitate