File 930/1912 'Mohammerah - Khoremabad Railway' [‎166v] (339/396)

“ (1) that it would not only tap practically the
“ whole of the trade now carried between Persia
“ and Bagdad (he., practically nullify the objep-
“ tive of the proposed Russo-German Klianikm
“ line), but also open up a large and new export
“ trade in cereals from the districts around
“ Burujird, Kermanshah, and Hamadan, which is
“ now quite impracticable owing to the prohibitive
“ cost of transport, and which would not even be
“ open to the suggested Khanikin-Bagdad route
w because of the high river freight from Bagdad to
“ the Gulf, added to the rail and/or road freight to
“ Bagdad ; (2) that it would, in all probability, be
“ highly remunerative; and (3) that it would
“ practically ensure to the British sphere the whole
“ 0 f the trade of central and northern Persia not
“ secured by the Caspian, and also open up in
“ competition with Russia a large amount of trade
“ in British cotton goods and other manufactures.
“ The capital for this railway, however good its
prospects may be, cannot, of course, be obtained
“ from ordinary channels without a guarantee < >f some
“ sort, because of the insecurity of the country.
44. The Secretary of State’s despatch of the
4th November 1910 as to the Trans-Persian Rail
way was answered in a letter of the Government
of India, dated the 23rd February 1911, enclosing,
together with a convenient index map, memoranda,
&c., by various officers, and the Report ol an
inter - departmental Committee, consisting of
Mr. W. H. Clark (Member of Council), Sir D Haig
(Chief of the General Stall), Sir T. Wynne (President
of the Railway Board), and Mr. J. B. W ood (foreign
Department). It may be useful to summarise briefly
the opinions that were expressed, though such a
summary is necessarily somewhat imperfect.
Views of various officers of the
Government of India.
Secret Letter of Government of India,
No. 18, 23rd February 1911.
Pol. 437/10.
(1) The Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Guij
(Colonel Cox) favoured an alignment from Kerman
via Bam, Regaii, Bampur, Serbaz, Kej to Karachi or
Hyderabad, as less open to strategical objection
than a Kerinan-Nushki route, more useful through
its tapping of better country, and more useful for
checking the Mekran arms traffic. He thought
that, as a condition of our co-operation with
Russia in promoting the through route, she should
join with His Majesty’s Government in obtaining
a concession for a Mohammerah-Julfa line, and in
commencing the Mohammerah-Hamadan section
when the Khanikin branch of the Bagdad Railway
was about to be linked with the Russian system
via Kermanshah. He favoured concessions, for
blocking purposes, of branch lines (1) from
Mohammerah ma KhorMusa, Behbehan, and Shiraz
to Kerman, and (2) from Bunder Abbas to Shiraz,
and the actual construction of a line from Bunder
Abbas to the through line at Bam.
(2.) The Agent to the Governor-General and
Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan (Sir H.
Colonel Cox’s telegram, 20th December
1910, (enclosure 1 of Letter).
Sir H. McMahon’s letter, 20th Decern
her 1910.
(Enclosure 2.)