File 930/1912 'Mohammerah - Khoremabad Railway' [‎175v] (357/396)

sterling. It is not too much to say that “Sfatorptirom^a t-Rnsst
southern zone we sttll monopol.se it ^-^Tthis trade-at least in
InlVfoUow :iit ; e and a ^stlrn of'carefully W0 " ld ’ “ 3 ^
time, deprive India of one of her best and most lucrative maikets.
13 These considerations are sufficiently serious. ^ The political ones are more sa
fcass; t“ o:"; o s
ii^iglSliisS—
posts aid garrisons to guard what would then have become a vulnerable, though it
is now a negligible, section of the Indian border.
14. The Minute which I wrote on 4th September 1899 and sent W
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. with the Government of India s Despatch of -1st P >
sufficientlv indicated the extreme strategical importance to India of Seistan. The
sufficiently momateu i since made t0 deve lo p the trade
success that has attended the o»orts wmc^ ^ trade having ris en in two
rears from d to 15 lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees —has tended to increase both our interest and our influence
fn"hat rdon of the Shah’s dominions, and has encouraged us to project the early
m inai puiuui u e ^ tn Nnshki te over the first 90 miles ot the
^rTLlian railway through Seistan to the Gulf-followed as it must be by
the political absorption of Seistan—would not merely kill this promising enterprise,
Ind closrL one Remaining overland trade route (that to Yarkand and Kashgar is
already nearlv dead) that still remains open to Indian commerce, but it w ould ha-ve
the following^further and even more serious consequences. It would place Russia
control of a district ethnographically connected with Baluchistan, would pro
foundly affect our prestige both with Afghan and Baluch, and would greatly enhance
the difficulties that we already experience m managing the cognate tribes 011 1 G
Indian side of the border. If Great Britain is ever called upon to advance to
Kandahar as she will probably one day be compelled to do, an intolerable state of
friction would arise between the Powers that would then control the upper and the
lower waters of the Helmund. Moreover, while Seistan, if it ever fell under British
influence, could, owing to the protecting floods upon the north, be easily ( Kdendec
against Russian attack from the direction of Meshed our present frontier .should
Seistan pass into the hands of Russia), being entirely exposed, would enjoy no
similar immunity. I might easily enlarge at greater length upon the strategical
importance to India of Seistan. But as I believe it to be now general y recognized
hoth here and in England, it wall be sufficient to say that a Russian railw ay throng 1
Eastern Persia to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. means neither more nor less than the final loss to
Great Britain of Seistan : and that the recent declarations of the British Government
as to our interests in that quarter forbid me to believe that they would acquiesce m
any such calamity. For my own part, if Persia were to hypothecate to Russia the
revenues of Seistan (a move which has recently been under contemplation, but
which I should regard as not less insulting to ourselves than would be to Russia the
hypothecation of the revenues of Meshed to Great Britain), or to cede to Russia a
commanding political position on that section oi the border 1 should not hesitate to
advise that the Persian Government be compelled to cancel the arrangement. Such
a peril can, however, be more opportunely averted by a plain declaration of our views
and intentions in advance, than by threats or military movements afterwards.
15. Should a Russian naval port be constructed in the Gulf, and should a
Russian fleet (most likely in connection with the French) be^ called into existence
in the Indian Ocean, it is impossible, either for the protection of our trade, or lor