File 930/1912 'Mohammerah - Khoremabad Railway' [‎181v] (369/396)

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“ this plateau are commonly of great altitude P'^Xu^lu^Lffiemton
“ cS 000 feet in height, and being as a rule so precipitous that even mute tratnc upi
“ them isnof unattended with danger. Herein lies a prehmmary obstacle con-
“ querable indeed by engineers, but only at a hazardous cost to the pocket either
“ of Government or of shareholders. it i Tlflis Tabriz-Tehran
The following lines of railway were then considerep—(l) phis-iabriz ienrar
(n 6251 (2) Baku-Lenkoran-Resht-Tehran (p. 626), (3) Meshed-i-Ser-phran (p. 626),
(\) Gurgan Valley i e., Gez to Bujnurd and Kuchan (p. 626), (5) AskhabadGvuGha
^e U d rg (p n 627), (6) bushak-Sarakhs-Meshed (p C27) ! 7 > T" B ^fiVhran
(8) Seistan Railway (p. 628), (9) Trans-Persian Line p. 629 , GO) Bus
(p. 629), (11) Mohammerah-Burujird-Tehran (p. 630), and (12) Bagt
(n 631) ; lastly, the Indo-Mediterranean railways. . „ R]1 i •
4s regards (10), Lord Curzon did not think that the project oi uniting Bus
with Tehran ml Shiraz would ever be realised owing to the enornmus difficultie^
the country between Shiraz and the sea, though a line from Ispahan to Tehran was
quite feasible. Of the prospects of (11), a Mohammerah-Buruprd-rd^ 1.^ he
was much more sanguine, pointing out that there was a consensus of opinion that it
was Z railway moft likedy to pay in Persia. Of (11), the Bagdad-Tehran Railway
he wrote • “This line might he expected to do a considerable business, though it
•‘wTuWbe a costly one to construct 1 , the ascent from the Chakkean plains to the
" Persian plateau being very steep and difficult. But neither in gooi s
passenger traffic could it compete with the line last sketched nor would it tap the
“ resources of so extensive a country, nor be so easily reached from the sea
His conclusion as regards a Euphrates Valley railway, approaching Bagdad lit
the Mediterranean, was that it “ did not for the present at any rate he within the
“ domain of practical politics.” This opinion was based on physical, political,
military, and economic grounds. A continuation of the line from the head of the
Gulf by way of Mohammerah, Bushire, Lingah, Bunder Abbas 3ask, and Uwadur
to Karachi, would fail, he said, even more conspicuously on the iour-ioid test t
“ would be costly, absolutely unremunerative to Persia, and perilous to nealtn.
Of a line from Bagdad along the Euphrates or Tigris Valley, and then mu
Shuster Shiraz, and Bunder Abbas, along the Mekran Coast to Karachi he had no
hi oh opinion. The true line of Trans-Persian railway communication would, Ire
thought, be more to the north, uniting the great agricultural, manufacturing, an
commercial cities of Persia. “Such a line is more likely to be found along the
“ track Baghdad, Kermanshah, Burujird, Isfahan, Yezd, Kerman, which 1 believe
“ to be the ultimate route of through communication by rail, in the far distant days
“ when such a development becomes possible. \\ hat 1 have elsewhere said with
“ reference to a Seistan railway will show how this scheme might connect with the
“Indian railways, and how it would possess the further advantage, if ever
“ constructed and brought into communication with Europe, of depositing the
“ British soldier, not merely at Karachi, but on the Afghan frontier itself, and at
“ the probable theatre of war.”
If this line were ever realised, he thought connection with the Mediterranean
would be effected by already existing railways m Asia Minoi.
Russia in Central Asia (1889), Ch. 8, pp. 269-271.
This chapter dealt with the effects (in 1889) of the Trans-Caspian Railway. The
author therein deprecated connection of the railway with Quetta via Kandahar on
fiscal and political grounds. Indian trade would gain nothing owing to the pro
hibitory tariffs of Russia, while Russian merchandise would descend upon
Afghanistan Seistan, &e. The advance of Russia would mean an increase to the
Indian Army, Ac.
(ii.)
Colonel C. E. Yate, C.S.L, C.M.G., Khurasan and Sis tan (1900), pp. 426-9.
Colonel C. E. Yate commented on the general desire of Russian officers in Central
Asia to connect the Trans-Caspian Railway with the Indian railways at Herat. He
did not himself see how such a line would pay or what goods would travel by it.
Passengers would prefer the sea route via Marseilles. He did not see that India
would gain anything except quicker mails.
(HI.)
Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich, K.C.M.G., Ac., The Indian Borderland (1901),
pp. 219-224. T t •
Sir T. Holdich considered that a coast line from Basra and Bushire along the
eastern shores of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and the northern shores of the Arabian Sea to