‘Report for the Army Council on Mesopotamia. By Sir John P Hewett, GCSI, KBE’ [‎4v] (13/119)

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5. The problem which then faced the administration was the two-fold one of providing necessary
supplies for the army, and at the same time preserving the civil population from starvation. Round
the town of Basrah we occupied a block of country fairly well settled and cultivated. We had also under
our control a narrow strip of land stretching up to the Euphrates as far as Nasiriyah. Beyond Nasiriyah
there had been in the spring no control whatever. This area contains the most fully developed tract
in Mesopotamia, and from it the Turks collected the main portion of their land revenue. The tribes here
had been cultivating for three years uncontrolled by their landlords, and no revenue whatever had been
collected. At the end of May troops were sent to control the Hindiyah (Hindie) barrage, and on the 22nd
May a political officer was sent to Hillah, but he had no military force to back him. The Turks occupied
the post of Diwaniyah (Diwanie) until the 29th August, and constant intrigues, conducted by a German
secret service officer attached to the Turkish forces, were going on with the tribes in the neighbourhood.
Further up the Euphrates the inundation canals north of Musayib were badly silted, and a very small
harvest had been reaped. The Hindiyah barrage was not under control, and the Turks, while they had
done some of the excavation for the canal to be taken off from above the barrage on the west (the Beni
Hasan canal) had done practically nothing towards the construction of the eastern canal, now called the
Georgiyah, after His Majesty. As a consequence the crops on the Hindiyah branch of the Euphrates
below the barrage, which had formerly depended on inundation canals, were entirely deprived of water,
and in the Hindiyah district there was no crop whatever. In the Hillah branch of the river there had
been heavy sowings in the area commanded by the canals, but, owing to the accumulations of silt and to
the scanty rainfall, the yield of the matured crop had been very light. Karbala (Kerbela), and the
surrounding lands had been flooded. The cutting of the Saklawiyah (Sakhlawie) dam, west of Baghdad,
by the Turks had so reduced the volume of water in the Euphrates that the rice crop sown in the Shamiyah
district, situated to the west of Diwaniyah, had largely failed. A certain number of pumps existed in
the Diwaniyah district, but they were out of action owing to lack of oil, and the canals had long since
silted up. There had apparently been a good crop on the Dagharah (Dighara), but the grain was in the
hands of two or three speculators, and the full wealth of the district was for long kept concealed.
6. On the Tigris from Samarrah to the vicinity of Baghdad all cultivation had been destroyed by
military operations, which were being conducted when the crop ripened. Near Baghdad rain failed,
and there had been no flood on the Tigris for the third season in succession. Cereals and fodder had been
jeduced to a minimum. From Baghdad to Kut the Turks had removed the tribes from the river banks
and forbidden all cultivation. On the Diyalah they commanded the heads of the principal canals with
their guns, and in the Baqubah (Bakuba) area many acres of grain were destroyed by military operations.
When in September the headworks of the canals came into our possession, roads and railways were laid
down so rapidly that many water courses had to be blocked.
7. The canals had everywhere deteriorated. Thus, in the rich Hillah area at the time of our occupa
tion there were 54 canals having, when in working order, an individual command varying from 240 to
22.000 acres, all in very bad condition. The majority are private property, and no control had been
exercised over the proprietors. Seven canals had been left absolutely idle for several years, owing to
unadjustable disputes between the landlords and tenants. One canal which was the property of Govern
ment, had also been allowed to fall into disuse. The rest were badly silted up. The Radhwanyiah
canal furnishes a striking instance of the general neglect. It is an inundation canal on the Euphrates
capable of commanding many thousand acres, and is in the joint possession of four different families.
No attempt had been made for the last ten years to bring it up to a proper standard of efficiency.
At the time of our occupation the water channels had silted up to such an extent that it did not
command more than ten thousand acres.
Such was the situation which led to the inception of the agricultural development scheme in July,
1917. Famine was threatening the civil population, and prices were so high that holders were tempted
to sell their seed stores. It was necessary to extend the cultivated area with the utmost promptitude,
and it was not possible to secure the increase required without large advances of cash and seed combined
with extensive clearing of water channels, and some addition to existing canals.
The Scheme for Agricultural Development in 1918.
8. The inception of the scheme for 1918 was due to the initiative of Mr. C. C. Garbett, C.I.E., of
the Indian Civil Service. He had become Revenue Commissioner on the 1st February, 1917, and was
subsequently given the position of First Revenue Officer on the Revenue Board. The military authorities
estimated that, in order to provide for the needs of the army in the advanced area, 90,000 tons of cereals,
mainly barley, and 150,000 tons of bhusa (chopped straw) were required. The scheme which Mr. Garbett
prepared contemplated the provision of these supplies for the army after the needs of the civil popula
tion had been met. It was proposed to finance it from army funds as there were no civil revenues
available for the purpose, and therefore, unless the money required could be provided in this way, the
addition to the cultivated area, essential alike for military and civil needs, could not be secured.
Mr. Garbett estimated that, in order to provide the grain required, it was necessary to bring 600,000
acres of land under crop. He calculated that this area should produce 280,000 tons of grain. Taking
the following data as the basis of his estimate, viz., five-eights of a ton of barley and one-fourth of a ton
of wheat per acre, he calculated that 220,000 tons of barley could be raised on 352,000 acres, and 60,000
tons of wheat on 240,000 acres. To secure this crop he estimated that a little less than 30,000 tons of
seed would have to be sown. He calculated that, if left to themselves, the farmers would sow about
15.000 tons of seed, and that another 15,000 tons must be advanced to them. The scheme, therefore,
as originally devised, provided for the supply of 15,000 tons of seed, at a cost of £250,000. The amount
likely to be required for clearing water channels was estimated at £20,000, and that for agricultural