File 2182/1913 Pt 1 'Persian Gulf Situation in El Katr Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎56r] (118/318)

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Foreign Secret.
From Viceroy, IQth August 1913.
policy which His MaiestvWh! ^ 0U1 tlf '* e " ram 0 ' ^th instant. In view of
to Bin Saurwe find some iTr:r ire - exphcitly laid down « -gard
telegram of 30 th July ' Wedprm it l <X|> ’ <S8lll f our opinion on Cox’s
Majesty’s Government the ’ 0ur ^ *». place Wore His
rigid adherence to that nollo'v • oll S l> > .l ec t 10 ' ls to which, in our opinion, a
imminitr h b t, hl 7 ,self t0 K1 ){asa he could be ignored with
impunity Such a policy, however, cannot in our opinion safely be nursued
now that there is a possibility of his interference in El Katr with th“ Trucial
encVtchm Zt, V! y “ 3'“^ ^/ebeUion may give him a'n op >oL“
S = l5 U TV em n l \ seems t0 118 therefore that we must now
decide whether he is to be conciliated or estranged. To threaten Bin Sand
Fnlatr !ffv her Parl 7i "tthfotciWe expulsion if he attemps to interfere in
LI ivatr affairs cannot but have latter effect [while if] threats were ignored we
is most’d COm Pf lefl to undertake military operations, a consummation which it
is most desirable to avoid. Unless we come to some mutual and amicable
understanding with the Amir who has hitherto been friendly disposed to us the
probability is that we shall force him to adopt an attitude of permanent
hostility which cannot but react unfavourably on the Chiefs of the littoral
VV e therefore strongly advocate not any definite treaty with the Amir but a
friendly interchange of views in which we should intimate to him that we
expect nim not to interfere with the territories of Chiefs with whom we have
treaty oh other relations in the Gruff littoral. We see no reasorl why if this
were done with the full knowledge of the Porte to whom our intentions
could be clearly explained there should be any risk of offending Turkish
susceptibilities or raising their suspicions. We might warn Trucial Chiefs
seriously against any provocative action against the Amir, but instead of
assuring them of immunity from him which is only likely to encourage
them to assume a truculent attitude towards him we might tell them that
our relations with Amir are such that their fears of aggression on his part
are groundless.
\\ e are repeating to you a telegram which has just been received from
Cox in which he advocates a similar line of policy.
*
From Viceroy, llth August 1913.
Foreign Secret. Following is repetition of telegram from Bushire,
dated 7th, semi-official.
“ I have received blue print of Foreign Office letter to India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors.
No. 29,150, 2nd July.
I note that Secretary of State’s telegram of 3rd July takes a more
benevolent line, the pertinence of which I fully appreciate ; but I submit
that the letter above quoted hardly takes adequate cognisance of fact that at
any rate for a long time to come the Porte can exercise no control whatever
over Bin Sand, and that meanwhile he is in a position to give a varying deal
of inconvenience alike in regard to Oman, the Trucial coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. and Katr, which
inconvenience an innocuous modus vivendi, arranged if necessary with the
knowledge of the Porte, would obviate. It is not a question of any desire
to interfere in politics of Central Arabia. Bin Sand is now at the coast,
and lor us it is a question of a new menace to our interests in the Gulf
sphere which we need either to sterilise or protect ourselves against. Surely
there is no logical reason why the interests of our proteges should suffer
severely because Porte cannot control one of hers. If the Government of
India share my apprehensions perhaps this aspect of the question should be
commended to the further consideration of His Majesty’s Government.”