'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎12r] (23/248)

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 21
ON BAGHDAD.
5. Sir John Nixon’s plan was favourably endorsed by Sir Percy Lake, then Chief of
the General Staff, at Simla, and sent by him, on September 9th, to the Commandcr-in-
Chief, Sir Beauchamp Duff, who, however, minuted Sir Percy Lake’s memorandum, “ unless
we can get back troops from France, Egypt, or elsewhere, I fear that Baghdad, invaluable
as its capture would be, is out of the question.”
6 . It is not clear whether Sir John Nixon’s plan and the Commander-in-Chief’s
Minute on it, were ever sent to England or submitted to the Viceroy, but it is clear that
the latter never ruled out from his mind the possibility of advancing to Baghdad in the
future. Thus, on August 27th, in writing to Sir Thomas Holderness, the Viceroy advocates
an advance to Kut-el-Amara, and points out that “ at Kut-el-Amara we are in a good
position to strike at Baghdad should the necessity arise and more troops be available.
Again, on September 17th, in writing to Mr. Chamberlain, he emphasises the desirability
of advancing to Baghdad if only sufficient troops can be made available.
But whatever may have been in the minds of the authorities in England, India and
Mesopotamia, with regard to Baghdad as an ultimate possibility, it does not appear to
have been brought forward as an immediately practicable proposition until October 3rd.
7 . The position of the Expeditionary Force at that time was as follows -Kut he d been
occupied on September 28th, and General Townshend, with characteristic dash, had pushed
on his cavalrv in pursuit of the enemy, and on October 4th they were at Aziziyeh, some 50
miles beyond Kut on the road to Baghdad.
On October 3 rd, General Nixon, as General Officer Commanding the expedition, tele
graphed to the Secretary of State :—
“ I consider I am strong enough to open road to Baghdad, and with this intention I propose to concentrate
at Aziziyeh.”
On the next day he telegraphed to India :—
“ With reference to my suggestion to open by another general action the road to Baghdad, will you kindly
let me know whether my force is to be reinforced to the extent of another division from t ranee in order that my
position there may be maintained. - ’
These telegrams were despatched on the assumption that the demoralisation of the
retreating force was such that our pursuing vanguard could get into Baghdad upon their
heels. But. only a day later it became clear from further communications that the enemy
were not so disorganised as to prevent their making a serious stand, and General Townsheud
was cognisant of this fact.
8 . On the 5 th October General Nixon telegraphed that the enemy appeared to be
no longer retreating, but had occupied the Ctesiphon position, and thereby constituted a
threat to us. Still, he considered it desirable to smash him while he could, and he “ saw
nothing which would justify letting slip such an opportunity.” It is necessary to emphasise
this point, as it is clear from subsequent telegrams that the sanction of the Home Govern
ment to advance on Baghdad was given on the supposition that the Turks between Kut and
Baghdad were not likely to offer really serious opposition. The policy of the Cabinet up to
that date in Mesopotamia had been defined by Lord Crewe in a telegram dated April 24th,
1915, to the Viceroy, the concluding words of which were :
Any proposal involving possible demands for reinforcements or undue extension is to be deprecated however.
Our position is strategically a sound one, and we cannot at present afford to take risks by extending it
unduly. In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.
9 . This policy was endorsed by a telegram from Mr. Chamberlain, who had on May 27th
succeeded Lord Crewe as Secretary of State for India. The relations of the Cabinet to
the officers in the field were further defined in a telegram on May 23rd already alluded
to, in which the Secretary of State, while sanctioning the advance to Amara, added :
Under present circumstances only the Cabinet should decide questions jointly affecting civil and military
policy.
10 . On October 4 th, in accordance with that policy, the Secretary of State sent two
telegrams to the Viceroy, one private and one official, which ran as follows :—
Private. Sir J. Nixon’s plans. Please refer to my official telegram of to-day on this subject. Your
private letter of the 10th ultimo seems to render it imperative to stop the further advance of General Nixon’s
force. If you will communicate to me your views early I shall be grateful.
and :—
Will you kindly inform me what General Nixon's present intentions are, as, if on account of navigation
troubles there is no probability of the retreating enemy being caught up and smashed, there is no object in the
pursuit being continued.