'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎19v] (38/248)

36
PART VIL—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT.
April, 1916, the immediate policy to be followed in Mesopotamia had been clearly indicated
by the Imperial General Staff. Briefly summarized it was as follows :
At present our policy in Mesopotamia is defensive . . . Lake should . . . maintain as forward
a position as can be made secure tactically, and be ready to take advantage of any weakening of the lurks
on his front, so long as this can be effected without incurring heavy loss, whether caused by the enemy or by
unhealthy conditions . . . His forces are superior to those of the enemy ... he should, therefore,
have no difficulty in carrying out the above policy until the Turks are strongly reinforced ... he must
be clearly shown that the security of his force is of primary importance.
These instructions were strictly adhered to during the summer and autumn, and Sir
Percy Lake and his successor, Major-General Maude, confined themselves during this
period to developing river and railway communications and the supply organisation,
with very satisfactory results.
31. We have already pointed out that early in February, 1916, the War Office assumed
control of the expedition. Later on, in July, 1916, all the administrative work in connection
with the expedition was transferred to the War Office, and from that date they became solely
responsible for the policy and management of the expedition. But the War Office have not,
even under these arrangements, any control over Indian Military Establishments in the
sense of being able to order reinforcements from India to Mesopotamia. We have not
thought it desirable or necessary to make detailed investigation beyond the date of the
operations which failed to relieve Kut. Since then new plans of campaign have been
devised, and are in active operation. We have, however, satisfied ourselves- that the
transfer of the conduct of the expedition to the War Office had been most beneficial so
far as the supplies and comfort of the troops are concerned. Officers selected for high and
responsible command have shown both decision and ability in grappling with and surmount
ing difficulties, which face them : the transport has been greatly increased, and although a
certain amount of hardship may still from time to time be experienced by the troops located
in Mesopotamia, this is due more to the inconvenience inevitable in a campaign than to
lack of prescience and organisation on the part of the administrative authorities. The
medical equipment, both in personnel and material, is also altogether on a higher standard
than in the past.
We may add that we have been very favourably impressed by the evidence of the
representatives of the War Office, and from that evidence we deduce that the difficulties
of campaigning in Mesopotamia are fully recognised by the War Office, and that in sur
mounting them neither time nor expenditure will be spared in future.
We were directed by the terms of our reference to enquire into the origin, inception
and conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia. We have partially performed this task,
so far as the origin and inception of the campaign are concerned, by the narrative we
have given. We now propose to give fuller attention to the conduct of the campaign, and
this task includes an investigation into the “ supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition
and equipment to the troops and Fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded, and the
responsibility of those Departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister
to the wants of the forces employed in the theatre of war.”
As our narrative has already indicated, the main difficulties to be overcome in
Mesopotamia were those connected with transport. This branch of our enquiry, practically
covers questions connected with all classes of supplies and reinforcements, and it also
materially affected the provision made for the sick and the wounded. We therefore intend
to make a close and detailed examination ( 1 ) into transport requirements and the measures
taken both in India and Great Britain to meet these requirements, and ( 2 ) the provision
for and treatment of the sick and wounded.
The supply of armament, equipment, and reinforcements necessary for the expedi
tion, will also require notice, and we will deal with this forthwith.