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'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎24v] (48/248)

The record is made up of 1 volume (122 folios). It was created in 1906-1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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46
PAET IX.—TRANSPORT.
A. Shortage of River Transport. *
tonnage up to the beginning of 1916, covers the period which is the main subject of our
enquiry. Any vessels asked for after January, 1916, even if ready-made in India, could
not have had any effect either upon the operations for the capture of Baghdad in 1915
or for the relief of Kut.
11 . In order to appreciate the responsibility attaching to General Nixon, it is necessary
to look at the position on the various dates on which he suggested the main moves up the
river, or received authority to make these advances. The three most critical dates may be
taken as those of the decisions to ad\ance from Kurna to Amara, from Amara to Kut,
and from Kut and Aziziyeh to Baghdad.. Each of these advances, it must be remembered,
involved a special demand on the River Transport in respect of the carriage of troops,
ambulance transport, ertillery, &c., and pro tanto diminished the amount of River Transport
available for ordinary supply. The dates when these advances were authorised were
May 23rd, 1915, August 7th, 1915, and October 23rd, 1915.
General Cowper gives the daily tonnage available on these three dates as 175 tons,
less an allowance for vessels off work for repair, leaving, say, 150 tons daily available at each
of the three dates.
General Lake, in the despatch describing the operations of the force under his command,
writes as follows :—
The number of steamers available in January, 1916, for river transport purposes was practically the
same as when, in June, 1915, the first advance up the Tigris took place.
In addition to steamers and barges, a certain number of native sailing craft, called
mahailas, were utilised, but were unreliable owing to their being unable to make progress
up river against wind and current.
12 . It is important to remember what General Nixon had before him in taking the
first step from Kurna up the river. Each of the advances from Kurna to Amara, Kurna
to Naseriyeh, Amara to Kut, and Kut towards Baghdad, was, it is true, only taken after
it was recommended by the General, and authority obtained from the Government of
India and the Government in London. Nevertheless it is our definite opinion that these \
advances—at least as far as Kut (just outside the limit of the Basra Vilayet)—should
have been anticipated by General Nixon and provided for in time, seeing that even the
possibility of an advance to Baghdad could not have been out of his mind, in view of
the instructions given to him on his proceeding to Mesopotamia to take command.
13. The following is an extract from the orders given to him by the Commander-in-
Chief in India, dated March 24th, 1915 :—
“ Operations. After acquainting yourself on the spot with the present situation, you will submit:—
1. A plan for the effective occupation of Basra Vilayet.
2. A plan for the subsequent advance on Baghdad.”
It is clear, however, that the Government in London had no intention at this time of
authorising an advance, so far as Baghdad. The correspondence shows that they
deprecated too large a commitment in Mesopotamia, and the limits of action indicated by
them were the protection of the pipe line from the Anglo-Persian oilfields to Abadan
and the occupation of Basra V ilayet which extends to a point just below Kut-el-Amara.
But in the case of military operations dependent on river transport, the need for timely
preparation was of special importance. It would appear in these circumstances no more
than ordinary prudence to prepare long in advance for all contingencies, and not to advance
until the necessary transport had been provided.
14. The total tonnage on the river on May 23rd, 1915, was small—too small even for
the existing force, if it was to advance and thereby lengthen the lines of communication.
Moreover, of the steamers available more than half exceeded a draught of 3 feet 6 inches, and
it had already been found that it was practically impossible to get suitable steamers
from India, with a maximum draught not exceeding this limit. The only alternative,
therefore, so far as river transport was concerned, was to build new steamers, and these
could not be available under 12 months from the date of the order being despatched.
15. A great deal of correspondence and some misunderstanding took place between
General Nixon and • India as to the specification, and in particular the maximum
draught of steamers suitable for Mesopotamia. It is difficult to visualise the conditions x
of the river and of the country. At certain times of the year the river overflows its
low banks, and the plain is turned into a vast sea of water. Transport by road.

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Content

A signed proof, folios 1-100, plus additional material, folios 101-124. The cover bears the signature of Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under-Secretary of State. The report has been annotated in blue pencil at various points.

Contents:

  • 'Part I. Preface.
  • 'Part II. Origin of Mesopotamia [Iraq] Expedition.'
  • 'Part III. Advance from Basra to Kurna.'
  • 'Part IV. The Advance to Amara [Al-'Amārah] and Kut [Al-Kūt].'
  • 'Part V. Correspondence and Telegrams as to Advance on Baghdad.'
  • 'Part VI. The Advance from Kut to Ctesiphon.'
  • 'Part VII. Operations for Relief of Kut.'
  • 'Part VIII. Armament, Equipment, Reinforcements, &c.'
  • 'Part IX. Transport.'
  • 'Part X. Medical Breakdown.'
  • 'Part XI. Causes Contributing to the Errors of Judgement and Shortcomings of Responsible Authorities.'
  • 'Part XII. Findings and Conclusions. Recommendations.'
  • 'Separate Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP.'
  • 'Appendix I. Vincent-Bingley Report.'
  • 'Appendix II. Memorandum by Sir Beauchamp Duff.'
  • 'Appendix III. Colonel Hehir's Account of the Siege of Kut-el-Amara.'

Additional material:

  • Folio 101. Manuscript note [by Arthur Hirtzel] on net military expenditure.
  • Folios 102-109. Copy of the East India (Army Administration), Further Papers regarding the Administration of the Army in India , 1906.
  • Folios 110-115. Manuscript notes, titled 'Suggested redraft & amplification of second half of parag 1' [unknown hand].
  • Folio 116. A clipping from the Daily Telegraph , Wednesday 4 July 1917, featuring an article titled 'Mesopotamia. Ex-Viceroy's Statement. The Medical Breakdown.'
  • Folios 117-124. An expanded typescript version of Hirtzel's manuscript notes (folio 101).
Extent and format
1 volume (122 folios)
Arrangement

A table of contents can be found at folio 4v.

An index can be found at folios 93-97.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at the front cover with 1, and terminates at the last folio with 124; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional foliation sequence is present in parallel between ff 110-115; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled. Pagination: the file also contains an original printed pagination sequence. The volume comprises a stitched pamphlet, and other stitched and loose-leaf material.

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English in Latin script
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'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎24v] (48/248), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/20/257, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100036338403.0x000031> [accessed 29 March 2024]

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