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'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎81r] (161/248)

The record is made up of 1 volume (122 folios). It was created in 1906-1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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159
Instead of despatching the latter with their brigades,
they were kept back in the same way as the field ambu
lances, with the result that General Aylmer had only nine
supply and transport officers with him when he commenced
his advance, instead of 40 which would have been the
normal complement. The shortage in the subordinate
and follower ranks was equally marked and the complaints
made in regard to the feeding of the sick and wounded after
the January battles, were partly due to this cause. The
issue of rations was often delayed through the inadequacy
of the supply personnel, which could not cope with the
sudden demands created by the influx of hundreds of
wounded. There was no lack of food and comforts on
the steamers which acted as supply columns, but there
was not the staff to provide for their rapid issue and
distribution. This deficiency undoubtedly reacted on the
sick and wounded and accounts to some extent for the
complaints that patients in the ambulances were unable
to get food. The staff of the Tigris Corps had been
hurriedly formed, and the officer in charge of administra
tion had not had much experience in this important work.
The staff of the 7th Division did not arrive from France
until after the battle of Shaikh Saad. Previous to that
action, it was entirely extemporised. With such defective
machinery, friction and lack of co-ordination were
inevitable, and these, doubtless, tended to increase the
difficulties of the overworked and understaffed medical
services.
148. We believe that no action on the part of the officers
responsible for the medical arrangements of the force could
have prevented, to any great extent, the sufferings endured
by the wounded on January 13th, 14th, 21st and 22nd ;
and the evidence before us abundantly proves that,
generally speaking, the energy, kindness and industry of
the executive medical officers who were directly in charge
of the wounded, were beyond all praise. We do not,
for reasons already stated, consider that the administra
tive officers of the medical services used available resources
in the best manner possible in the engagement of the
January 7th ; but we do not think that they can be held
responsible for the breakdown which occurred after the
later actions. We desire also to place on record our
opinion that the Corps Commander, General Aylmer,
cannot in any way be held responsible for this failure.
Military reasons, and the direct orders of his superior
officer, made it incumbent on him to advance without
delay to the relief of Kut with an improvised staff and a
force not properly organised. His medical establishments
were about one-third of the authorised scale, and the
shortage in supply and transport establishments was
greater still. These deficiencies he represented from time
to time to the Army Commander, both before his advance
and after the battle of Shaikh Saad, referring at the same
time to the lack of river hospital steamers. In such
circumstances it would, in our opinion be unfair to hold
any man, much less an officer whose solicitude for the
welfare of the soldier is so well known, in any way to
blame for the sufferings which resulted from these
deficiencies.
149. We have stated above, that the conduct of the
executive medical officers, generally speaking, was beyond
all praise ; but we must refer to the case of an officer,
whose conduct has been severely criticised by numerous
witnesses. It has been freely stated that after the action
of January 21st, when this officer was in medical charge
of the steamship “ Julnar,” then used as a hospital steamer
he was negligent in his duty, that the patients who were
sent to him received insufficient food and no proper
medical treatment, and that they were discharged from
hospital with orders to return to their regiments when
they were yet unfit for duty. These facts were reported
at the time by General Kemball to Sir Fenton Aylmer,
who found, after inquiry, that the charges were not
proved. The evidence that we have recorded, and the
written statements that we have received, do not in our
opinion support this finding; but in view of the fact that
the decision was arrived at after an inquiry made at the
time, by an officer with first-hand knowledge of the facts,
we do not think that we ought to differ expressly from
it. We may say, however, that this officer was in our
| opinion very fortunate in being exonerated from blame.
150. Attack on Es-Sinn. — For various reasons the
medical arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded
at the battle of Es-Sinn were much more successful than
(C 48—176.)
during the operations of January. The weather conditions
were more favourable, the field medical units attached to
the 3rd and 7th Divisions had arrived at the front, and
the increase in the medical establishments made it possible
to detail a fairly adequate staff of medical officers and
subordinates to each steamer used for the transport of
sick and wounded to the base. The arrangements were
in many respects far from ideal, but we have reason to
believe that the improvement was realised by everyone
and much appreciated. The battle took place on the
right bank of the river and extended to a distance of
16 or 17 miles from Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. where the force was encamped,
the total number of wounded being approximately, 2,440.
It appears that the original intention was to collect these
wounded in a part of the enemy’s position known as the
Dujailah redoubt. As the attack was not successful,
these plans had to be changed and ultimately the wounded
were collected in a place called the Dujailah depression,
at some distance from the redoubt. Throughout the day
and during the night following the engagement, the
wounded were brought into this collecting post and were
there fed and tended at the field ambulances. On the
following morning they were sent in a convoy to Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows.
camp, a halt being made en route for water. The*convoy
reached Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. the same night, and the patients were there
accommodated in field ambulances and clearing hospitals.
There was some delay in crossing to the left bank of the
river by the bridge near the camp, but this delay was,
we think, unavoidable. The evacuation from Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows.
to the base was promptly effected in river steamers, to
each of which a medical staff and a supply of medical stores,
appliances and comforts was allotted. There was no
delay in the evacuation, and the wounded were received
in good condition at Basra. We think that the arrange
ments on this occasion were as satisfactory as circum
stances permitted. The main sources of discomfort were
twofold—the use of transport carts for the conveyance
of wounded by land, and the lack of river hospital steamers.
The want of ambulance wagons, tongas, or motor ambu
lances, was serious, owing to the great distance of the
battlefield from the camp, and the sufferings of the
wounded during this journey of 17 miles gave rise to great
complaints.
151. Subject to these defects, we think that the
arrangements were satisfactory and that great credit is
due to the officers directly responsible for the collection
and evacuation of the wounded. In arriving at this
conclusion we are not unmindful of the criticism of a
witness who has attacked the arrangements made on this
occasion in somewhat severe language. We do not doubt
that discomfort or suffering was undergone by individuals,
and that certain patients received less attention than
others at the collecting station and on arrival at the
camp ; but such experiences are unavoidable in the con
fusion following a battle, particularly when a reverse is
experienced and the casualties are heavy. The great
preponderance of evidence before us is to the effect that
on March 8th there was a great improvement in the
medical organisation, and that on the whole the evacuation
of the wounded was effected expeditiously and methodi
cally, and we are prepared to accept this as correct. We
believe that this is also in accordance with the opinion of
the Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Percy
Lake, an officer who has, if we may say so without
impropriety, made every endeavour to secure the ameliora
tion of the medical arrangements.
152. Operations on the Tigris in April .—The next
action, that of April 5th, when the Umm-al-Hannah and
Falahiyah positions were attacked, was witnessed by two
of the Commissioners who personally investigated the
working of the arrangements for the collection and
evacuation of the wounded on the battlefield. These
arrangements were carefully thought out' and proved
very successful. The number of stretcher bearers was
sufficient, the collecting stations were conveniently
situated, and ample provision was made for the comfort
and medical treatment of the wounded, who were promptly
evacuated to the camp at Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. by the “ Aerial ” motor
boat and in motor cars and ambulance wagons. The
organisation was methodical and worked smoothly, and
the Commission saw nothing to call for unfavourable
criticism in the arrangements made, save that the pro
vision of more motor boats and of additional ambulance
transport would have been a convenience. The Turkish
X 2

About this item

Content

A signed proof, folios 1-100, plus additional material, folios 101-124. The cover bears the signature of Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under-Secretary of State. The report has been annotated in blue pencil at various points.

Contents:

  • 'Part I. Preface.
  • 'Part II. Origin of Mesopotamia [Iraq] Expedition.'
  • 'Part III. Advance from Basra to Kurna.'
  • 'Part IV. The Advance to Amara [Al-'Amārah] and Kut [Al-Kūt].'
  • 'Part V. Correspondence and Telegrams as to Advance on Baghdad.'
  • 'Part VI. The Advance from Kut to Ctesiphon.'
  • 'Part VII. Operations for Relief of Kut.'
  • 'Part VIII. Armament, Equipment, Reinforcements, &c.'
  • 'Part IX. Transport.'
  • 'Part X. Medical Breakdown.'
  • 'Part XI. Causes Contributing to the Errors of Judgement and Shortcomings of Responsible Authorities.'
  • 'Part XII. Findings and Conclusions. Recommendations.'
  • 'Separate Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP.'
  • 'Appendix I. Vincent-Bingley Report.'
  • 'Appendix II. Memorandum by Sir Beauchamp Duff.'
  • 'Appendix III. Colonel Hehir's Account of the Siege of Kut-el-Amara.'

Additional material:

  • Folio 101. Manuscript note [by Arthur Hirtzel] on net military expenditure.
  • Folios 102-109. Copy of the East India (Army Administration), Further Papers regarding the Administration of the Army in India , 1906.
  • Folios 110-115. Manuscript notes, titled 'Suggested redraft & amplification of second half of parag 1' [unknown hand].
  • Folio 116. A clipping from the Daily Telegraph , Wednesday 4 July 1917, featuring an article titled 'Mesopotamia. Ex-Viceroy's Statement. The Medical Breakdown.'
  • Folios 117-124. An expanded typescript version of Hirtzel's manuscript notes (folio 101).
Extent and format
1 volume (122 folios)
Arrangement

A table of contents can be found at folio 4v.

An index can be found at folios 93-97.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at the front cover with 1, and terminates at the last folio with 124; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional foliation sequence is present in parallel between ff 110-115; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled. Pagination: the file also contains an original printed pagination sequence. The volume comprises a stitched pamphlet, and other stitched and loose-leaf material.

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English in Latin script
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'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎81r] (161/248), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/20/257, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100036338403.0x0000a2> [accessed 29 March 2024]

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