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Alexandria. He was incensed, too, that Nahas had not even bothered to answer
his letter. In spite of a long apology from Nahas, Ibn Sand decided not to
participate in the conference and told Nahas so in no uncertain terms. Finally,
however, he agreed to send a delegate after the assembled Arab delegates had
appealed to him in a joint telegram. Anxious not to commit himself, however,
Ibn Saud instructed his representative Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to act as an observer
only, thereby reserving his agreement to any resolutions until after he had
studied them carefully.
6. Ibn Saud considered the Alexandria Protocol went too far and objected
to anything which might conflict with the religious principles on which his
kingdom was founded. On His Majesty’s Government’s advice, however, he
showed himself more accommodating, although maintaining his reservation
regarding religious principles. In this mood he discussed the question with
A.bdur Rahman Azzam Bey, the Egyptian special envoy who came to persuade
him to accept the protocol, and at the end of the year there seemed a fair chance
that he would do so. Later he agreed to allow his delegate to sign the protocol
with certain reservations.
7. As regards the establishment of Arab propaganda offices in Washington
and London Ibn Saud agreed in principle but here again was opposed to any
precipitate action. He advocated that representatives of each Arab State should
be sent to London and Washington bearing letters setting out the Arab case
to His Majesty King George VI, President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, and only
in case these representatives advocated the establishment of propaganda offices
j would he agree to it. His reluctance to agree to the establishment of these offices
j i s probably due to the embarrassment he feels in not being able to contribute
towards their expenses on a scale commensurate with his predominant position
] in the Arab and Moslem world.
8. Ibn Saud continued to pay the-closest attention during the year to the
Palestine question which in his own words he described as “ the king-pin of
Arab unity.” Though he himself admitted that as an Arab and a Moslem he
could not but oppose Zionist ambitions in Palestine he never allowed his feelings
to prevail over his conviction that it was not in the interests of the Arabs to
raise this question during the war. One of the main reasons why he agreed
to participate in the Alexandria Conference was the assurance given him by
the various Arab leaders that the Palestine question would not be raised in an
acute form. Quietly and without fuss Ibn Saud worked on the leaders of Egypt,
Syria, the Lebanon and the Temen to damp down controversy over Palestine
and avoid precipitating a crisis. The Wagner resolution, followed by the Demo
cratic and Republican parties’ planks and the British Labour party resolution
provoked no outbursts from Ibn Saud as they did in other Arab countries. In
order to make sure that his policy was in accordance with His Majesty’s Govern
ment s wishes the King at the end of the year asked His Majesty’s Government
to restate their views and agreed to be guided bv them in future discussions on
Arab unity.
9. In Syria and the Lebanon Ibn Saud did his best to pour oil on troubled
waters urging their leaders not to take any action prejudicial to Great Britain
and her Allies while the war continued. Early in the year he took the opportunity
of visits from Jamil Mardam and Riyadh as Sulh to emphasise this point of
view. He was, as usual, in constant touch with Shukri Kuwatli on whom he
exercises considerable influence. He was dismayed when Shukri accepted Nahas’s
invitation to the Alexandria Conference and tried hard to dissuade him. When
Shukri appealed to him to support his protest against the proposed conclusion of
a treaty with France Ibn Saud replied that he had himself to blame because of
his intransigent attitude towards the French. He advised Shukri to follow
His Majesty’s Government’s advice and warned him not to embarrass them in
Syria. Although concerned over the question of a treaty with France Ibn Saud
was reassured when His Majesty’s Government declared that their policv
regarding Syria remained unchanged. ‘ ^
10. The Iman Yehya, whom the King describes as a man living out of touch
with the world, came increasingly under his influence during the year and allowed
himself to be guided by the King’s wise counsels, not only over such seemintov
remote issues as Arab unity but also over matters directly affecting the Iman as
for instance, the Haudh al Ma dispute. As regards the former, the Iman on Ibn
Saud’s advice, sent a delegate to the Alexandria Conference with the’role of
an tc observer.” Over the dispute with the Government of Aden he accepted
the King’s strong hint to climb down and evacuated Haudh al Ma