Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎17r] (34/540)

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10. It may be well to add a few details which illustrate with particular
force the difficulty of diplomatic dealings in a place where the head of the Govern
ment lives normally about 800 miles away from the only town in which the British
representative is allowed to live. Even in ordinary circumstances the difficulties
are considerable, and when it is a question of bringing about an interview at a
given moment they are greatly increased. His Majesty’s Government wished the
report of the Technical Commission on Palestine and their statement of policy
to be communicated to Ibn Baud twenty-four hours before publication, and for this
purpose Sir R. Bullard wished to reach Riyadh before 4 p.m. G.M.T. (about 8 p.m.
local time) on the 8th November. Unless the caravan was to travel at a pace which
would be inhuman for the drivers, who in any case would be driving ten or more
hours a day, he would need to leave on the morning of the 5th November. In
point of fact most of the 5th November was spent in decyphering the statement
of policy and other instructions, and a start was made only on the 6th November.
In order that at least the essence of the information should reach Ibn Baud by
the appointed time a very brief summary of the statement of policy was made,
to be given to the Kaimakam of Jedda in good time for it to be cyphered and
transmitted to Ibn Baud by wireless so as to reach him by 8 p.m. Riyadh time on
the 8th November, but in spite of careful calculations and previous arrangement
with the kaimakam, the message did not reach the King until about 10 a.m. on
the 9th. Sir R. Bullard arrived in Riyadh at noon on the 9th. He sent to the
King at once a translation of the statement of policy and of a summary of the
report, which had been made on the journey, but he was not able to see the King
at once as he still had to spend four hours decyphering a Foreign Office telegram
which had followed him from Jedda. Ibn Baud did receive the news in advance
of publication, though not the full twenty-four hours in advance.
Violation of Saudi Territory.
11. The trivial complaints of trespass over the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan border into
Saudi territory by Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan troops or officials are mentioned in the section
on Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan . There were also several protests against alleged violation of
Saudi territory by aeroplanes at various places near the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan frontier,
but on no occasion could the authorities in Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan find that the complaint
was well founded, not even when the Minister for Foreign Affairs told a circum
stantial tale of Saudi flocks being scared at night by an aeroplane which turned
a searchlight on them. Sometimes there was no record of an aeroplane being in
the neighbourhood in question within a day or two of the date specified, and on
the one occasion when the Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to have specified
place and date reasonably exactly, it was denied that the aeroplane ever crossed
the border.
12. In March a note was received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
saying that after sunset on the 22nd February a large warship anchored “ in
the waters of Jabal Katan south of Qahma opposite Khisa ” (close to 18° north
latitude); the local authorities thought that the vessel was perhaps British, and,
if she was, the Saudi Government must express their disapproval at her coming
“ without previous permission as usual,” and must protest against the violation
of their sovereignty. The same note said that before sunset on the 26th February
two aircraft had flown over Qahma Mountain towards the sea. His Majesty’s
Minister was told by the Saudi authorities that a similar note had been addressed
to the Italian Legation, though in that case it was suggested that the aeroplanes
were Italian, not the warship. Sir R. Bullard was able to inform the Saudi
Government in due course that no British warship was in those waters, and no
British aircraft in that area, on the dates named. Later on, he learned privately
that the Saudi authorities believed both ship and aeroplanes to have been Italian.
13. Further consideration had to be given to the question of the islands of
Tiran and Senafir, at the mouth of the Gulf of Akaba. The conclusion had been
reached in 1936 (paragraph 189 of the report for that year) that Saudi Arabia
alone had a good claim to them, and that it would be unwise to raise the question.
What the attitude of the Saudi Government might be was unknown at the time,
but in May 1938, when the commanding officer of H.M.S. Fleetwood was paying
a call on the Kaimakam of Jedda and referred to Tiran and Senafir in connexion
with his approaching voyage to Akaba, the kaimakam said that these islands
were of course part of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. A vague reply was returned
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