Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎19v] (39/540)

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28. By a similar exchange of letters it was agreed that a joint survey of the
common frontier should be carried out with reference to Protocol No. 1 of Uqair,
of 1922. This correspondence was notable for two points. One was the insertion
in the Saudi reply of the condition which was attached to the Saudi acceptance
of His Majesty’s Government’s proposal for a joint survey of the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
frontier, viz., that the information and maps resulting from the survey should be
for the purpose of negotiation regarding the line the frontier should take. The
other was the inclusion in the Iraqi proposals of the words : “If the Saudi
Government have no surveyors to co-operate in this work with the Iraqi surveyors,
then the latter can do it by themselves, provided the Saudi Arabian Government
bear half the cost.” It is not surprising that the Saudi reply ignored this con
descending offer and merely agreed to “ the appointment on their behalf of a
party to co-operate with the Iraq party in a series of trigonometrical surveys. ...”
The Saudi Government had, in fact, obtained the loan of an American surveyor
from C.A.S.O.C. The beginning of the work was delayed for some time owing to
the lateness of the Saudi survey party in arriving on the ground, while the great
heat necessitated the suspension of the work for over four months in the summer.
The Saudi plan is to begin the joint survey of the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan frontier when that
of the Iraq frontier has been completed.
29. Official British reports from Iraq and Koweit suggest that the prestige
of Ibn Saud on and beyond the Iraq frontier is increasing. A dispute between
the I bn Hadhal and Ibn Mi j lad sections of the Amarat (a division of the Anaiza)
which occurred on the Iraq frontier seems to have been settled by Ibn Musa’id, the
Amir of Hail, without any help from the Iraqi official who had been sent down to
deal with it. Some of the Sa’duns were reported to be in touch with Ibn Musa’id,
and some sections of the Huchaim who went further than usual into Saudi Arabia
were cordially received and returned untaxed and with presents of rifles and
ammunition. Ihe name of Ibn Saud was in high repute among the Euphrates
tribes who are opposed to the Iraq Government, and allegations have even been
made that Ibn Musa’id, or some other person, has been running arms from Saudi
Arabia into the Euphrates country.
30. Ibn Saud spoke to His Majesty’s Minister with some indignation about
the designs of the Iraq Government on Koweit. This may have been one of the
considerations which made him anxious to conclude the trade agreement with
Koweit to which he had hitherto been indifferent if not hostile. It will not have
pleased him to learn that the malcontents who caused trouble in Bahrein in the
autumn included in their demands that where foreign officials could not be
replaced by local men Iraqis should be engaged.
Palestine.
31. Of the vast number of Palestine papers for 1938 the first which needs
recording is a report of negotiations by Shakib Arslan in Syria for the holdiny
P f awte ab I Junng the Pilgrimage to discuss the question of
1 alestme. His Majesty s Minister reported that Ibn Saud would not consent tc
such a proposal, and in fact nothing came of it. consent tc
32. On the 4th January Sir R. Bullard had an audience with the Kinu who
was m camp at Muhchtha and handed to him the text of the statement whifh was
to the new Technh.ai O g P 0 ^ of His Majesty’s Government in regard
to tne new lechmeal Commission, which was to find out facts concprnlnJthp
partition scheme and work out details as to finance, boundaries, &c The Kim?
appeared to be grateful to have been informed in advance. However he was stiH
policy of His Maiestv’s Government' 6 ^committed if it had not been for the
felt optimistic; he probably meant that lie ’^’ Nevertheless, declared that he
commission could support the policy of partition" n0t ° 0ncelve that the new