Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎28r] (56/540)

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106. A scurrilous article attacking the Bahrein Administration which
appeared in an obscure Egyptian paper was traced with almost complete
certainty to a Hejazi journalist named Abdullah-al-Mazru, who is connected with
the Mecca newspaper, Saut-al-Hijaz. Mazru denied that he had been in
Bahrein, but Fuad Bey admitted to His Majesty’s Minister that the man had been
^ in Bahrein, and that it was highly undesirable that such attacks should emanate
from a person connected with the Saudi press.
107. At the beginning of the year it was found that the Saudi authorities
in Hasa were endorsing on the passports of all persons leaving the mainland for
Bahrein a formula which might be read as permission to enter Bahrein, and were
charging for it the large fee of 4/12 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. . The subsequent negotiations took
many months, chiefly because of the absence of Fuad Bey on leave, but by the end
of the year the objectionable formula had been exchanged for one more closely
conforming to international usage, and the fee for Bahrein subjects had been
reduced to the equivalent of about 15. Qd. Whether the arrangement is satis
factory An East India Company trading post. to the Government of Bahrein has, however, yet to be learned.
Koweit.
108. It is customary for certain tribal sections from Saudi Arabia to
winter in Koweit, where the grazing is better, but in the winter of 1937-38 the
contrast between the drought in Saudi Arabia (for the second year m succession)
and the good rains in Koweit led to a great influx into Koweit of Saudi tribesmen
from as far away as the Yemen border and the neighbourhood of the
Rub-al-Khali. Implicit in the permission granted by Ibn Saud to Saudi tribes
to oraze in Koweit is permission to restock in the Koweit market, but this year
Ibn Saud also allowed all the Bedouin living in Nejd near the common frontier
to go to Koweit to make their purchases.
109. In March the Saudi Government accepted the latest draft of the
proposed Koweit Agreement pretty much as it was, and said that they were
ready to examine the text of the two subsidiary agreements. Drafts of the latter
(“ Bon-Voisinage ” and Extradition) were prepared by the political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at
Koweit and discussed by the departments concerned in London, but as between the
legation and the Saudi Government the subject remained dormant until, when
His Majesty’s Minister was at Riyadh in November, Ibn Saud made the
surprising statement that he would like the agreement to come into force as soon
as possible. He referred to a recent increase in smuggling as one reason, but said
that the principal reason was that customs and preventive arrangements had to
be made at Ras Tanura, and their nature and extent depended paitly on whethei
there was an agreement with Koweit or not.
110. In reporting Ibn Sand’s change of policy in regard to Koweit, His
Majesty’s Minister mentioned three considerations as being probably the most
influential of the motives at work on his mind, viz.
(1) The discovery that Ras Tanura was likely to be less advantageous as a
port than had seemed probable when the project was still remote.
(2) Suspicion of Iraqi designs upon Koweit. j n •
(3) A desire to support an Arab fellow-ruler whose position appeared to him
to be endangered by the creation of a Koweit council.
It is certain that Koweit is the natural port of entry for goods for a large part
of Saudi territory, and in maintaining the blockade for so long Ibn baud has
perhaps played into the hands of those Iraqis who claim that Koweit is the
natural port for Iraq and wish to strengthen economic, if not political, ties with
that State.
Ill Ibn Saud feels very deeply what seems to him the humiliation inflicted
upon the Sheikh of Koweit by the setting up of a council on the wrong lines.
When referring to this subject m conversation with Sir R. Bullard at Riyadh he
said that it would have been quite correct that the sheikh should appoint a
council composed of people of position to advise him. but half the members ot
his council were of no importance at all. The Kmg seemed to regard this as
dangerous to Arab rulers in general, not merely to the Sheikh of Kowe ^ t -
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