Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎31r] (62/540)

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130. On the 1st July the Foreign Office replied to the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. in a long
letter, of which the following is a summary : The European crisis and the
deterioration of the situation in Palestine had made it essential to do everything
possible to retain the goodwill of Ibn Baud and to strengthen his hand in his
dealings with his own people, and to give him access to the Persian Oulf at a
new point would be helpful in both directions. The rights of the Sheikh of Abu
Dhabi extended in theory to the blue line, but His Majesty s Government had
had to recognise that he had not asserted his authority farther than the Riyadh
line at the utmost. In so far as he had lost his rights, they had lapsed
automatically to Ibn Baud as the result of a movement which probably began
before the blue line came into being. Recent enquiries on our part had shown
that the control of the hinterland by the Trucial sheikhs was not really
effective, whereas Saudi officials had been able to penetrate in recent years as
far as Baraimi. The only way to check Ibn Baud’s advance was to have a settled
frontier, either by fixing one unilaterally or by coming to an agreement with
Ibn Baud The second alternative was obviously the best. It could only be
secured by ceding to Ibn Baud either Jabal Nakhsh, which was impossible, or the
Khor-el-Odeid, which required the acquiescence of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi.
The surrender of this small area of empty desert would matter little to the
sheikh, whereas that area would be welcome to Ibn Baud both on grounds of
prestige and as a possible corridor for an oil pipe-lme. If the sheikh was
unable to see the matter in that light, some form of compensation would have
to be considered, either in the form of a money payment, or of an assurance of
support in the event of a serious attack from the landward side 1 ayment or
money was admittedly distasteful, as importing a questionable element into a
settlement which could be justified on its merits, but, if it came to a financial
arrangement, His Majesty’s Government ought to be prepared to pay £25,000
or even more to secure a settlement. The alternative form of compensation,
viz an assurance of protection, would not apply to tribal raids from Saudi
Arabia- the undertaking should be so worded as to apply only m the event of
a major aggression against Abu Dhabi on the part of the territorial Sovereign
on the othCT side of the frontier. The Foreign Office were inclined to think that
this would not in practice increase the responsibilities of His Majesty s
Government in that area. Our interests in the air route and m ml must prevent
our remaining indifferent to any threat to the territories of the Trucial sheikhs,
though the Foreign Office agreed that every effort should be made to avoid giving
the additional commitment involved in a definite guarantee of any frontier that
might be arrived at and to limit our support to a promise to intervene energetically
with Ibn Baud or his successors in the event of their disregarding the new
frontiers His Majesty’s Government had a right to insist on their point of
view since the Trucial sheikhs could not last for a day against Ibn Baud without
the protection of His Majesty’s Government. The danger which might result
from a diminution in the prestige of His Majesty’s Government m the Gulf was
realised but it was not believed that the proposed action would necessarily have
that effect. Why should not the advantages of a settled frontier be understood
locally ? ‘‘ It might, indeed, be represented to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi that
Ibn Baud is the friend of the British and has throughout his career (unlike
pertqin lesser Arab rulers of no importance who are ignorant of world affairs)
shown himself consistently well-disposed to His Majesty’s Government and
anxious in all circumstances to consult their interests; so that His Majesty s
Government, for their part, have no hesitation m asking the sheikh to
contribute his share towards an agreement which is considered to be
advantageous to all parties.” As to the opinion expressed by the Government
of India that there were political objections to making a breach m the hue of
territory under British control extending from Qatar to Muscat, the Seivice
Departments were understood to be satisfied that there were no strategical
disadvantages to be apprehended from Saudi access to the Khor-el-Odei .
Moreover, a settled frontier would have the effect of setting a limit to Saudi
expansion.
130a The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , after consulting the Government of India replied to
the Foreign Office letter on the 7th October They maintained their determined
opposition to the proposal to cede Khor-el-Odeid to Ibn Baud. The Uncial