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whether to contribute to the repair of the railway or not, but this does not account
for their failure to send any reply to the invitation of the Saudi Government to
take part in a conference on the subject in January 1939.
157. Rumours which had been referred to in the Syrian press, that during
his visit to Mecca for the pilgrimage the Syrian Minister of Finance would confer
with Ibn Sand as to the possible adhesion of Syria to the Saudi-Iraqi-Yemeni
Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance, were disposed of by Fuad Bey, who informed
His Majesty’s Minister that this was at present impossible, as France was in
charge of Syria’s foreign affairs. He added, however, that there was a plan to
attach to the French Legation in Jedda a Syrian Consul who would eventually
split oft’ and be independent.
158. Syrians are more prominent than popular in the Hejaz. Nearly all
the doctors are Syrians, and no one seems to consider them either competent or
honest; while Najib Salha, who as the Jedda representative of the Ministry of
Finance is almost openly lining his pockets, is the object of particular dislike.
These “ foreigners,” as the Hejazis call them, do little to cement the unity of
the Arab world.
Italy.
159. Mr. Eden’s resignation at the end of February was made the subject
of a communication to the Saudi Arabian Government, in which they were
assured that that resignation showed no change of policy, and that, although
conversations with Italy were about to begin, His Majesty’s Government had
in mind their particular position in regard to Saudi Arabia, and the interests
of that country. This elicited an urgent reply, in which the Saudi Arabian
Government enquired whether the Rome Understanding of 1927 would be
discussed, and whether His Majesty’s Government would “ persist in respecting
it.” They were reassured on that point. The Imam Yahya of the Yemen
endeavoured to persuade King Ibn Sand to urge that the subject of Palestine
should be discussed during the Anglo-Italian conversations, but the King took
no action of this sort.
160. On instructions, His Majesty’s Minister forwarded to the Saudi
Arabian Government, on the 12th April, a memorandum showing the provisions
concerning Arabia which were likely to result from the Anglo-Italian conversa
tions then proceeding. Five days later he explained the proposals of
His Majesty’s Government concerning the proper action to be taken at Geneva
in order to clear up the anomalous situation arising out of the Italian conquest
of Abyssinia. A reply to the former communication merely expressed gratitude
and hopes for the future; and a similar reply to the second communication
expressed pleasure at anything tending to bring about good relations and an
understanding between the two negotiating parties.
161. The Saudi Arabian Government soon supplemented these general
observations with questions concerning the interpretation of certain parts of the
agreement. They addressed a note to the legation on the 27th April asking the
precise meaning of article 3 and article 5 (2) of the annex, which said that it
was to the common interest of the two parties that no other Power should obtain
sovereignty or a privileged position in this country, particularly on the coast of
the Red Sea, or in the Yemen; and that it was to the common interest of both
parties that no Power should intervene in any conflict which might break out
between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. To this His Majesty’s Minister answered
that the object was to prevent interference or encroachment by any foreign Power
whatsoever. It was supposed that the reason why the Saudi Arabian Government
showed anxiety was because certain Syrian newspapers had represented these
clauses as implying an Anglo-Italian protectorate.
162. Meanwhile, on the 3rd May, the Iraqi Government had handed in a
long document defining their attitude to the agreement in some detail. They put
a number of questions to His Majesty’s Government concerning the effect of the
agreement on the special relations established between Iraq, Saudi Arabia and
the Yemen by the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance of April 1936, to
which the Yemen had signified her agreement in 1937. This Iraqi protest does
not seem to have been drawn up in co-operation with the Other two members of