Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎35r] (70/540)

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the Arab alliance, and King Ihn Sand seems at first to have taken the view that
“ that’s the sort of thing the Iraqis would do but Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who
was in Bagdad at the time, probably thought otherwise and excited his
Sovereign’s suspicions. The long protest mentioned below, which the Saudi
Arabian Government subsequently addressed to this legation, showed that the
King’s chief fears were for his independence and liberty of action. There was
no suggestion on his part of any closer approach to Iraq, and it is safe to say
that the prospect of a political union with Iraq would fill the King with
annoyance and apprehension.
163. The considered observations of the Saudi Arabian Government on the
agreement were handed in to the legation on the 19th June. There was a covering
letter, which started by saying that the perusal of the full text of the agreement
revealed provisions touching the independence of Saudi Arabia. Being confident
that His Majesty s Government only accepted such provisions in order to pin
down Italy to non-interference in Arabia, they proposed to send His Majesty’s
Government and to Italy identic notes, drafts^ of which were attached.
164. I he draft notes said that the Saudi Arabian Government were not
affected by an instrument which they had not signed. The Saudi Government
asked the meaning of the words c ‘ common interest ’ ’ and ‘ ‘ privileged position
of a political character,” particularly with reference to the treaty with Iraq
and the Yemen. They suggested that article 3 was incompatible with the first
article of the Treaty of Jedda, and asked whether article 8 placed a time-limit on
our recognition of Saudi Arabia’s independence. The Saudi Arabian Govern
ment proposed to send in the identic notes after receipt of the reply of
His Majesty’s Government. It is to be noted that these communications did not
make so much of the Brotherhood Treaty as the Iraqi note did; nor was there
any mention of an Iraq military mission, or of the economic proposals made by
Iraq for a combined currency and a clearing agreement with Japan. Ibn Saud
also made the ingenious suggestion that his proposed notes would help His
Majesty’s Government by “ inducing the Italian Government to agree with them
in interpreting the provisions of the agreement in such a way as to remove the
ambiguity which it contains and which appears to destroy or limit our
independence.” Shortly after the receipt of this communication a private
enquiry was received from the King asking whether His Majesty’s Government
proposed to withhold recognition of the Italian conquest' of Abyssinia
permanently or only temporarily.
165. The proposal to send identic notes, which might involve the concoction
of identic replies with the Italian Government, caused His Majesty’s Govern
ment some apprehension. An interim reply was sent to the King saying that he
could rest assured that nothing in the agreement placed any time-limit on the
recognition of the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia. As for the
recognition of Abyssinia, a reply was sent to the effect that His Majesty’s
Government intended to grant de jure recognition when the agreement came into
force, which meant not before some settlement of the Spanish problem had been
reached. Finally, a long and reasoned reply to the points raised by the King’s
notes was sent m on the 18th July. This reply set forth in detail the meanino-
of the words “common interest ” and “privileged position of a political
character”; stated that His Majesty’s Government did not regard the
Brotherhood Treaty as contrary to such'“ common interest ”; denied that there
was any conflict with the Treaty of Jedda; reaffirmed that no time-limit was set
on the recognition of Saudi Arabia’s independence; agreed that the Saudi
Arabian Government was not bound by an agreement to which they were not
parties; and, in general, maintained that the object of the agreement was the
maintenance of the integrity and the independence of Saudi Arabia.
166. It was hoped for some months that this replv had been found
convincing by Ibn Saud, but Sheikh Yusuf Yasin began all over again when
His Majesty’s Minister was at Riyadh in November, and showed him a draft
note characteristically full of hypothetical questions. The discussions were
continued later m the year in Jedda, with Fuad Bey, who was inclined to accept
the view that, if the Saudi Arabian Government were determined to address
communications to the British and Italian Governments, thev should confine
themselves to principles and should not ask any questions first. ^