Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎63r] (126/540)

31
least the first two of the points in dispute. He was aware that the history of
the case went much further back than that, and that settlement by tribal
influence exclusively had been ruled out. What he wanted to avoid was forcing
the issue while the international situation was so disturbed, and he suggested
that it would be worth while to refrain from prospecting m the disputed area
and to wait for better times. The Foreign Office were unable to accept this
point of view. The rest of the story, however, belongs to
110 Supply of Arms.—In March Sheikh Yusuf Yasm informed His
Maiestv’s Minister that the Saudi Government wanted to enlist the help of the
United 7 Kingdom Government in their rearmament scheme, comprising the
establishment of a cartridge factory An East India Company trading post. at Riyadh and the purchase of guns, she .
and machine guns The Minister supported this proposal on the ground that
anv efforts this direction would not be wasted, as would those directed towards
the encouragement of the Saudi Government to embark on an elaboi ate aviatio
scheme.
111 When Sheikh Yusuf Yasin was in London at the time of the Corona
tion he' discussed with the Foreign Office the proposed cartridge factory An East India Company trading post. at
Riyadh. It was found, however, that the Saudi Government had merely got
estimates for equipment picked out of a catalogue from a firm that was no
itself'the maker of the equipment. It was found po^ to obtain “suranc
rvP thp Wir Office that equipment supplied by the makers m question ^
aonarenHy working well hi Bagdad, but Sheikh Yusuf Yasin was unable to
niirsue the discussion through technical ignorance and also through ignorance
of the exact requirements of his Government, and there the matter remained.
112 Efforts by His Majesty’s Minister to obtain an estimate of the Saudi
Government’s requirements in the matter of arms were unavailing. These
reouirements said Sheikh Yusuf, might be described as unlimited. It appeared
that the financial aspect of the matter was particularly '“P^^^y^-^Iso
thpv wanted most was rifles, guns and machine guns. Sheikh lusul Yasm also
added tanks but when asked whether he meant tanks or armoured cars he said
“ both or either ” It was at this time that Ibn Saud sent word that the Italians
JveoLTng to sell him Italian or German rifles or machine guns (see para
graph 134).
113 After a struggle with many difficulties, one of which was the fact
that the Saudi Government had paid only a small part of the cost of arms
supplied in 1929, it was found that HuTMajesty’s Government had a small
nnantitv of arms’and ammunition that could be supplied at a price within the
means of the Saudi Government, viz., 100 Lewis guns, 100 Hotchkiss guns,
four 18-pounder field guns complete, 1,000 rounds of shrapnel for the guns, and
10 million rounds of small-arm ammunition. Ihey could not oflei ufles at
comuetitive prices or even, in view of the British rearmament programme at
anv orice and purchase from a British firm, supposing the order could > be under
taken at the present time, would be even more expensive. His Majesty s Go\ein-
m® suggested that it might be well to seek supplies in some “ neutral country
such as Belgium or Czechoslovakia rather than from an interested party like
Italy The supply of armoured cars was, they said, surrounded by the same
difficulties as that of rifles.
114 Ibn Saud accepted gratefully the offer of the arms specified above, and
ibpv wprc hi Tided in Jedda from a British steamer on the 17th October, 1937 He
Wd have liked another battery of guns and 4 000 instead of 1 000 rounds of
shrapnel but in this it was not possible to oblige him An ab^ui d attempt to a
the arms secretly to the north of the town of Jedda only drew more attention to the
event which created a considerable stir, and is believed to have intensified the
Italian efforts to induce the King to accept arms from them on easy teims.
115 There was a suggestion that Ibn Saud might like to purchase some
cartridges which were theS at Berbera. They had been ordered by the former
Ethiopfan Government, but had not reached them before then collapse. The
scheme was not followed up, however, chiefly owing to doubt about the owneiship
of the ammunition.