Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎63v] (127/540)

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116. The reports, which were probably unfounded, that arms intended
perhaps for the Saudi Government had been landed somewhere on the shores of
the Gulf of Akaba are dealt with in the section on Palestine.
117. Air Facilities on the Hasa Coast .—In accordance with the suggestion
recorded in paragraph 69 of the report for 1936, the question of facilities for
British aircraft on the Hasa coast of Saudi Arabia was not followed up. No
British aircraft made a forced landing in Saudi territory during the year, so there
was nothing to remind the Saudi Government of the matter.
118. Hejaz Railway .—In January Fuad Bey enquired whether there was
any reply from London to the note about the Haifa Conference which the Saudi
Government had addressed to the British and French Legations in Jedda on the
20th January, 1936 (paragraph 70 of 1936). He hoped that after the change-over
in the administration of Syria something might be done. When reminded that,
according to the French, there had never been a surplus on the Syrian portion of
the line, he talked about the days of King Husain, when, he alleged, £10,000 was
spent in repairing the line and £40,000 was collected in fares and freight. Sir
R. Bullard, while deprecating the building of financial hopes on any budget of
King Husain’s, promised to wHte to the Foreign Office, though he reminded Fuad
Bey that the High Commissioner for Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan had been busy with other
matters.
119. A few days later a despatch was received from the Foreign Office trans
mitting a semi-official letter from the Colonial Office and the views of the High
Commissioner for Palestine on the Haifa Conference. The High Commissioner
endorsed conclusions 1, 2, 4 and 5. He was unable, he said, to endorse the recom
mendation of the Saudi representative that the repair of the damaged sections
should be effected at the expense of the line as a whole. Apart from the political
aspect of the question of ownership, there was the practical difficulty that neither
the Palestme- Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan section nor the Syrian section had any surplus funds,
while heavy expenditure for renewals would soon have to be incurred. It had been
estimated by the general manager of the Palestine Railways that, if 7,000
pilgi ims, each paying £P. 12 for a return ticket, were carried annually by the
railway, the costs of the restored line might just be covered and provision made
for some maintenance, but there would be no margin for renewals, and the HioR
Commissioner considered, on the basis of the numbers of pilgrims actually travel-
ling fiom Syiia, Iiaq, 1 alestine and Iransjordan, with a few Indians in transit,
that the figure of 7,000 pilgrims put forward by the Saudi delegate was much
exaggei ated. He pointed out that, if the restoration of the railway offered any
commercial advantages, it was to Northern Hejaz and Medina, and that conse
quently the financial liability should rest on the Saudi Government. The HioR
Commissioner said that he would be very glad if an agreed means could be found
to provide the capital required, since, apart from any incidental benefits to
I lansjoidan, the political relations between His Majesty’s Government and Ibn
Saud would, he suggested, be favourably affected.
!20 The semi-official letter from the Colonial Office said that it was unlikely
that eithei Palestine, Syria or I ransjordan could contribute towards a scheme of
lestoration, sa\e that Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan might perhaps undertake some responsibility
in respect of the small section in its own territory, if the whole scheme were
adopted. It seemed equally unlikely that the Saudi Government could find the
money, while the commercial possibilities were not such as to attract any private
syndicate. It therefore seemed that the only way in which the money‘could be
raised was for His Majesty s Government to provide it, not on commercial but
possibly on political grounds. The railway was destroyed during the Great War
and it might be argued that, regard being had to the history of its destruction
and to its general interest to the Moslem world, and as a gesture to the Moslem
world, His Majesty s Government should undertake to repair it It was also
worth considering whether the railway might have a strategic value to His
Majesty s Government as able to serve as a link in an alternative route to the Suez
Canal in a war with Italy in which Ibn Saud threw in his lot with us The letter
concluded by remarking that the railway had remained derelict for fifteen vears
without causing any great disturbance in the Moslem world, and might presum
ably continue to remain derelict without any untoward results. As time went on
the need for a railway would diminish, as pilgrims would tend to o- 0 to Mecca
more and more by motor routes.