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a month later. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin proved to be even more evasive and
eventually he informed Sir Andrew Ryan after, as he said, consultation with the
King, that they did not wish to touch on Sir Andrew Ryan’s conversation with
Fuad Bey about the agreement with Qatar: Sir Andrew Ryan or any other
British representative could follow up what had been said, upon Fuad Bey’s
return. In fact the King threw Fuad Bey and the alleged agreement heavily ^
overboard. To make the position quite clear Sir Andrew Ryan said that he could
only draw one conclusion from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin’s attitude, viz., that the King
disavowed Fuad Bey and did not endorse Fuad Bey’s statement regarding the
existence of the alleged pre-1916 agreement.
42. At this interview Sheikh Yusuf Yasin said that the King had not in
the past recognised any specific limits to the territories of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. rulers,
though he always treated them in a liberal spirit. When the Ikhwan system
was being organised he had directed the Ikhwan not to go into Dukhan or the
Araiq, in order that they should not incommode “ Ibn Thani.” The conver
sation turned to the letter which Ibn Saud had written to the Sheikh of Qatar
about the oil concession, and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin’s attitude compelled Sir Andrew'
Ryan to repeat the warning which he had had to utter, that if the threat contained
in the King’s letter were carried out, His Majesty’s Government would be bound
to protect what they believed to be the territory of the Sheikh of Qatar. Sir
Andrew Ryan also made our attitude on the question of correspondence quite
clear. The Saudi Government might think, contrary to our view, that they were
ree to address the Sheikh of Qatar direct, but if the sheikh received any com
munication from the Saudi Government, he was not merely free, but under an
obligation, to inform His Majesty’s Government about it.
(8) Bahrein.
43. The Bahrein Transit Dues Agreement embodied in the notes which were
exchanged on the 16th-17th November, 1935 (paragraph 42 of the 1935 report)
removed the only considerable ground of friction between Saudi Arabia and
liahrem. 1 he text of the agreement was published in the Umm-al-Qura of the
17th January 1936 In order, perhaps, to mark the conclusion of the agreement
Uie rulers exchanged presents, Ibn Saud sending three motor cars to the Ruler of
Bahrein in return for a present of ten hawks and twenty camels.
44. The protest from the Iranian Government which was elicited by the
agreement is dealt with more fully in the section on Iran. In their reply to the
Iranian Government the Saudi Government claimed that Bahrein used to belong
to the ancestors of Ibn baud, but said that they now recognised Sheikh Hamad-bim
^ aS Amlr - , [ the Bahrein Amirate. The suspicions of the Government of India
were aroused by the use of the word “Amir” in the Saudi reply, in place of the
“Amir 0 ”^Jh elnS h ‘ s t toncal title of “Sheikh”; they fea?ed tha? the word
l A s n had a e ?u USe u to v UggeSt that the sheikh was in som e way subordinate to
Ibn Saud, and thought that it might perhaps be well to remind the Saudi
authorities of the sheikh’s correct title. The point was examined carefully' but
it was found that the use of the titles “ Amir” and “ Sheikh” was too vague for
of ^Bahrein'as “ AmR’^Th^M 6 Government’s reference to the Sheikh
or mnrein as Amir. The title Amir is used, it is true for relativelv
unimportant Governors such as those of Tebuk and Kaf, and though the Amirs
KW X ? a ’ &c A are Highnesses they are subordinate to their father the
of S; Amir” 0n A?a e in 0th the title bears ^
i £ ^f in ’ .kae title Sheikh, which has long been the title
of the rulers of Koweit and Bahrein, is used on the Red Sea side of Arabia
for any townsman of consequence whom the title of “ Effendi ” or “Rev”
does not suit. Thus Yusuf Yasin, who must he tonim ^ 7 y -r
not all the Amirs in Saudi Arabia, is always styled “Sheikh Yusuf Yasin*’ It
was decided to take no action at the moment, but'to watch for any si urn of a desire
on the part of Ibn Saud to place the Sheikh of Bahrein in a position of
subordination with respect to himself position ol