Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎91r] (182/540)

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of Nuri-al-Shalan arrived and was married to the Amir Sand—not to his satis
faction, for he found that the beauty had gone to his father. Both the sisters
and their brother Fawwaz seemed to enjoy great consideration in this country.
(3) Italy.
83. The relations with Italy, which absorbed so much of the attention of the
Saudi Government in 1935, continued to preoccupy them this year, though what
had been acute anxiety perhaps calmed down to some extent towards the end.
The attitude of the Saudi Government towards the war in Ethiopia was
eventually defined in their reply to the League of Nations note about sanctions
(paragraph 117 of the 1935 report), which they addressed to the League on the
28th January. They had carefully considered, the note said, what assistance they
could give without departing from the attitude they were obliged to observe as
a pacific Government on friendly terms with both belligerents. As the Govern
ment responsible for the Moslem Holy Land they wished to maintain friendly
and stable relations with neighbouring countries or those inhabited by Moslems,
for the sake of Moslem pilgrims. On the other hand they were also anxious
to support any measures designed to promote world peace, to substitute peaceful
procedures and arbitration for wars and disputes, and as far as possible to restrict
the area of the present conflict. As, however, Saudi Arabia was not a member
of the League, they considered that their participation in economic sanctions
would involve heavy responsibilities without the enjoyment of the privileges
and advantages conferred on members of the League. These two considerations,
viz., the unique position of Saudi Arabia in the Moslem world and non
membership of the League, compelled them to observe strict neutrality in the
Italo-Ethiopian conflict unless special measures should be adopted granting to
States non-members of the League the same rights and privileges as those accorded
to member States.
84. In the course of a conversation in January, Fuad Bey intimated to
Sir Andrew Ryan, more clearly than either he or Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had done
in 1935, that the Saudi Government had committed themselves definitely in the
autumn to supplying the whole of the 12,000 camels required by the Italians,
and that they were being subjected to strong Italian pressure to secure the
completion of the contract. How many camels were eventually supplied in
addition to the thousand shipped from Yanbu in November 1935 (paragraph 82
of the 1935 report) is not known. Evidence from Koweit indicates that the
purchase of camels for this purpose from the Mutair ceased in December 1935.
85. It is known that there was much friction between the Italian Charge
d’Affaires and the Signor Odello who gave himself out to be a merchant and
contractor, but who according to a report from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin declared
himself to the Saudi authorities on one occasion to be an Italian officer and uttered
threats of Italian vengeance if his demands were not complied with. Both left
in January, and it was learned that both had gone to Rome and that M. Persico
had complained of Signor Odello’s activities and had been completely victorious.
Signor Odello did not return, and his family, whom he had left behind, departed
from Jedda in March.
86. ^ Towards the end of April the Saudi Government informed His
Majesty’s Legation, in confidence, of an offer recently made by the Italian
Government to make them a present of six aeroplanes, three of them for training
pilots, the others for civil aviation. They had been obliged, they stated, to accept
the offer, in accordance with their general policy of keeping up an appearance
of friendly relations with Italy, but they asseverated that Ibn Saud’s fundamental
policy of friendship with His Majesty’s Government remained unaltered.
Sir Andrew Ryan, to whom this communication was made by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin
under instructions^ from the King, replied in the sense of instructions issued
by the Foreign Office when their advice was asked in 1935, viz., that, while the
decision was a matter for the Saudi Government, the possibility that political or
other ulterior motives might underlie the Italian offer suggested that it should
be regarded with caution. Yusuf Yasin maintained that the greatest caution
had been used : the Italian Charge d’Affaires had assured the Saudi Government,
and at their request had even put this assurance in writing, that the sole motive