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(3) Yemen.
24. Good sense and an appearance at least of good feeling were the
characteristics of Saudi-Yemeni relations in 1935. There were not infrequent
rumours of fresh trouble between the two countries, but there is no evidence that
S** they were more than fanciful interpretations of imperfectly known facts. It is
true that the Imam’s eldest son was restless and disgruntled and is suspect in
Saudi eyes. It is also doubtless true that Ibn Baud has an eye to the eventualities
that might follow the Imam’s death, an event which is falsely reported from time
to time and which must really happen one day. It is possible that the King has,
as has often been suggested, some understanding with Seyyid Abdullah-al- Wazir Minister. ,
who is likely to play an important part, when the question of a succession to the
throne arises in the Yemen. In the meantime, however, it is plausible to suppose
that Ibn Saud is less concerned with internal Yemeni affairs than with the
consolidation of his own position in Asir and in Najran, and that troop
movements, which have been construed as preparations for a new war with the
Imam, are directed rather to that object.
25. A minor proof of the good sense mentioned above was given on the Saudi
side, when the Saudi Government denied in January the report that they were
interested in a rogue named As Sakkaf, who was on his trial at Sana for some
imposture and who had been spoken of as a spy. A much greater proof of it
was given when the King’s life was attempted by a party of Yemenis outside
the Kaaba on the 15th March. Opinion in Ihn Baud’s entourage was greatly
inflamed, and it might have gone hard with the Yemeni pilgrims had not he
himself exercised a moderating influence. Severe police measures were taken,
but there were no general reprisals, and Abdullah-al- Wazir Minister. , who had come on
pilgrimage, continued to be treated as an honoured guest. The Iman sent
telegrams full of horror and regret. 1 he Ministers for Foieign Affairs
corresponded less piously but without acrimony. Fuad Fey Hamza paid a
tribute in private conversation to the seriousness of the investigation undertaken
by the Yemeni Government. Its ineptitude was proved by the report transmitted
to the Saudi Government and published by them on the 3rd May, but it was
published without criticism. It was clear throughout that Ibn Saud had no
intention of making the affair a casus belli, despite the fact that it was widely
believed in Saudi circles, and possibly by the King himself, that the Yemeni Crown
Prince had had a hand in organising the outrage.
26. There was much talk at intervals during the year of the appointment
of commissioners to delimit the Saudi-Yemen frontier, in accordance with
article 4 of the Treaty of Taif of May 1934. This matter hung fire for unknown
reasons, but on the 22nd November the Mecca newspaper Umm-al-Qura
announced the appointment of two Saudi commissions, one for the delimitation
in the coastal area, the other for the interior. Nothing is known as yet about
the first commission, which was said to have already left Jizan for the frontier
district. The other was composed of a relative of the Minister of Finance, and
a former officer in the Turkish army now employed in the Saudi police administra
tion, with others not so well known. News of them was received from Najran
about the end of December.
(4) Hadhramaut.
27 It is occasionally suggested that Ibn Saud interests himself in the
Hadhramaut It is probably true that certain Hadhramis and persons connected
with the Irshad faction in Java, with which he has various contacts, urge him
to come in and put an end to the disorder which they represent as being rampant.
There is no evidence, however, of any readiness on the King s part to risk
embroiling himself with Great Britain by listening to such appeals. While his
name and°fame are familiar to various sections of the Hadhrami people, there is
equally little evidence that he counts for much m the eyes of the tribes whose areas
extend northward from the Hadhramaut. In a letter written m February 1935
the Resident at Aden suggested that, if the Hadhramis turned to any outside
ruler they would be more likely to look to the King of the \ emen than to Ibn
S-uid’ It may he noted in this connexion that, in the discussions with His
Maiesty’s Government regarding their eastern and south-eastern frontiers, the
Saudi Government have been at pains to disclaim any pretension to the allegiance
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