Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎109v] (219/540)

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16th June that three Saudi delegates reached Koweit. The conference, which
was attended by the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , lasted from the 17th to the 28th June. The
Koweiti delegates proposed the establishment of one or more customs posts in
Saudi territory, to which the Sheikh of Koweit would undertake to direct all
trade under a manifest system. The Saudi delegates torpedoed the possibility
of an agreement on that or, indeed, any other basis by making it a conditio sine
qua non that the sheikh should give an absolute guarantee that no smuggling
whatsoever would take place. At first they suggested that even a single case of
smuggling should upset the agreement. They relented only to the extent of stating
that the agreement would be cancelled if more than three cases occurred. They
rejected the alternative offered by the Koweiti delegation, namely, that the Koweit
Government should pledge their honour to do all in their power to prevent
smuggling. In these circumstances the conference broke down. The Saudi
delegates, though impressed by and apparently grateful for the hospitality of
their reception, were inconceivably arrogant in the actual negotiations.
46. The deadlock continued in spite of remonstrances addressed to Fuad
Bey Hamza during his visit to London and further correspondence in Jedda, in
the course of which Mr. Calvert confirmed in writing a previous intimation that
His Majesty’s Government would do all in their power to ensure the fulfilment
of the honourable undertaking offered by the sheikh. At last, however, when
Sir Andrew Ryan was in Riyadh in November, he was able, bv the use of great
pressure, including an intimation, under express instructions, that His Majesty’s
Government regarded Ibn Saud’s attitude towards Koweit as inconsistent with
his professions of friendship towards them, to drive the Saudis into a withdrawal
of their impossible condition. They proposed instead additional safeguards,
mainly in the nature of a control of merchants as well as of goods. These were
under consideration at the end of the year.
47. The preliminaries of the conference at Koweit were clouded and the
subsequent issues somewhat confused by an incident early in May. Large numbers
of Saudi tribesmen had been attracted into Koweit by good grazing. On the
6th May a small party of Saudi armed men, retainers of the Governor of Hasa,
detached from a larger party of tax collectors, entered Koweit territory and
proceeded to warn the Saudi tribesmen at at least two places that they must come
back to be taxed. The men were rounded up and taken to Koweit, whence they
were allowed to return to Hasa. His Majesty’s Government protested against
the intrusion and the assertion of Saudi authority in Koweit territory. This
protest drove Ibn Saud into one of his Royal rages, and, apart from his indignant
efforts to minimise the affair, his displeasure manifested itself in two ways. He
insisted on attaching an inordinate number of hangers-on to the delegation which
he was sending to Koweit, and he tried to insist in the official correspondence
about the incident that all movement across the frontier should be restricted
pending the conclusion of some general agreement. His Majesty’s Government
evaded this demand, but it may have influenced the nature of Fuad Bey’s
suggestions to Sir Andrew Ryan regarding additional safeguards to prevent
smuggling.
48. The blockade was maintained with as much severity as possible during
the year, and especially after the breakdown of the conference, which the Saudi
Government alleged, apparently more for the good of the cause than because it
was true, to have been followed by a great increase in smuggling.
49. Ibn Saud was said to be very angry with the Sheikh of Koweit for
having got him into trouble with His Majesty’s Government over the incident
described in the last paragraph but one. In November, however, the Political
Agent was able to report an improvement of their personal relations, thanks to
the King s childish pleasure at receiving a present of hawks from the sheikh. Two
instances came to light during the year of direct correspondence on official matters,
once in February, when an agreement was reached about Koweiti pilgrims
carrying special passes, and again in November, when the rulers exchanged letters
on a proposal by Ibn Saud to enforce a system known as Arafa in connexion with
camel claims on the frontier. These cases show that the subject discussed in
paragraphs 29 ff. above has a very material bearing on the relations between
Koweit and Saudi Arabia. It will be remembered that in 1934 a proposal to