Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎154r] (308/540)

[10178] b 3
I & IA
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place, though he would doubtless wish to dominate it if the promoters should
bring it off and, above all, to guard against its being dominated by any Hashimite
ruler.
(2) Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan .
General Course of Events.
16. The year opened in a certain atmosphere of anxiety lest Ikhwan
concentrations in the north of Saudi Arabia should portend an attack on
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan . Ibn Sand countered an expression of this apprehension by
referring to alarming rumours of activity hostile to himself on the other side.
These mares’ nests were swept away by mutual explanations early in January,
and the way was cleared for the continuance of the efforts of His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom to promote a general settlement between the
two countries.
17. Before describing how this settlement was brought about, it will be
convenient to dispose of a matter which had played a large part in the
controversies of 1932. In that year Ibn Saud was greatly perturbed by the
activities of the group of Hejazi political exiles, of whom the best known are the
members of the ad-Dabbagh family. He believed them to be hand in glove with
the Amir Abdullah; and there can be little doubt that certain members of the
Amir’s entourage, if not he himself, were implicated in anti-Saudi political
conspiracies. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom had exerted
themselves in many directions to remove causes of complaint. Steps were taken
to defeat, whenever possible, the activities of the Dabbaghs and their associates;
two persons who had been connected with them were eliminated from the
entourage of the Amir Abdullah; and the Amir himself and his cousin, the Amir
Shakir, were adjured to refrain from any compromising action. By the
19th March, 1933, it was possible for His Majesty’s Minister at Jedda to follow
up earlier communications regarding what had been done in Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and
elsewhere by a systematic statement in writing which described the measures
taken in regard to (1) the activities of the Dabbagh family and their associates;
(2) persons in the employment of the Amir Abdullah; and (3) the Beni Atiya tribe
and their leaders.
18. Sir Andrew Ryan’s letter elicited a cordial expression of appreciation,
and except for occasional echoes as when Tahir-ad-Dabbagh and another
conspirator made their way to India, little further was heard in the way of
complaint from the Saudi Government. They were, indeed, no longer greatly
disposed to magnify grievances of this kind, having been converted to the policy
of a treaty settlement, the history of which can now be summarised.
19. On the 11th January, 1933, Sir Andrew Ryan conveyed to the Saudi
Ministry for Foreign Affairs the definite proposals of His Majesty’s Government
regarding the procedure for mutual recognition between Ibn Saud and the Amir,
to be followed by negotiations for a bilateral treaty, for the fulfilment of which
by the Amir they themselves would be expressly responsible. The Saudi reply,
dated the 22nd January, was reasonably satisfactory, although it was not very
precise except on the one point that Ibn Saud’s assent to the proposals was based
entirely on his reliance on the promised British guarantee. On the loth February,
Sir Andrew Ryan proceeded to Jerusalem and Amman to discuss details of the
procedure, including the formulae by which mutual recognition was to be effected
and the drafts of treaty texts, based on those between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, to
be propounded in due course as a basis of discussion.
20. After Sir Andrew Ryan's return to Jedda on the 26th February, only
mechanical difficulties delayed the recognition procedure. It was completed on
the 1st April, when the High Commissioner for Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan communicated to the
Chief Minister of Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan a certified copy of a note from the Saudi
Government to the Legation in Jedda conveying the recognition by Ibn Saud,
while the Legation communicated to the Saudi Government a certified copy of a
similar note addressed by the Chief Minister of Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan to General
Wauchope. On the following day the rulers addressed to each other simultaneous
telegrams in previously concerted terms.
21. It had been agreed in principle that the treaty negotiations should be
begun in Jedda, and that if they could not be completed in a single stage of
limited duration they should be resumed in Jerusalem. On the 23rd April